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NOTES AND COMMENTS
versity of Minnesota, has for the past thirteen years been engaged in
the practice of law in Minneapolis and in the part-time teaching of
Business Law at the University of Minnesota.
Miss Margaret E. Hall, Assistant Law Librarian, has resigned to
become a member of the library staff at the Columbia University Law
School. She has been succeeded for this year by Mrs. Ben Gray Lump-
kin, Law Librarian of the University of Mississippi.
Associate Professor Frank W. Hanft has been promoted to a full
professorship.
Visiting professors during the summer session of 1937 included:
Professors Charles T. McCormick, of Northwestern University; Wal-
ter Wheeler Cook, of Northwestern University; James H. Chadbourn,
of the University of Pennsylvania; and Wesley A. Sturges, of Yale
University.
NOTES AND COMMENTS
Charities--Gifts to Enforce Prohibition Laws.
Testator in 1933 left a will providing: "$1,000 to any organization
which may be organized for the purpose of enforcing the prohibition
laws in Gaston County." After testator's death plaintiff corporation
was organized for the above specified purpose with the express power
to receive bequests. In an action against the executors the bequest was
held void whether considered as a gift or as a charitable trust.'
Gifts to aid in prohibiting or minimizing the manufacture, sale, or
use of intoxicating liquors, or to teach the evils of liquor, have been held
to constitute charitable trusts.2 It is no objection to their validity that
the state may have the responsibility for doing what the trustee is di-
rected to do.3 They further either an educational purpose or one ben-
eficial to the welfare of the community.4
'Dry Forces, Inc. v. Wilkins, 211 N. C. 560, 191 S. E. 8 (1937).
'Haines v. Allen, 78 Ind. 100, 41 Am. Rep. 555 (1881) ; Bo-wditch v. Att'y Gen.,
241 Mass. 168, 134 N. E. 796 (1922). For collections of similar cases see: Notes
(1922) 21 A. L. R. 951, 952; (1931) 73 A. L. R. 1361; ZOLLMAN, AMERICAN LAW
OF CHARITIES (1924) §272.
"Humphrey v. Board of Trustees, 203 N. C. 201, 165 S. E. 547 (1932), (1933)
11 N. C. L. REv. 179.
"'A charity, in the legal sense, may be more fully defined as a gift, to be
applied consistently with existing laws, for the benefit of an indefinite number of
persons, either by bringing their minds or hearts under the influence of education
or religion, by relieving their bodies from disease, suffering or restraint, by assisting
them to establish themselves in life, or by erecting or maintaining public buildings
or works or otherwise lessening the burdens of government. It is immaterial
whether the purpose is called charitable in the gift itself, if it is so described
as to show that it is charitable in its 'nature." Jackson v. Phillips, 14 Allen 539,
556 (Mass. 1867). Quoted with approval in Barden v. Atlantic Coast Line Ry., 152
N. C_. 318, 327, 67 S. E. 971, 975 (1910).
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A charitable trust is not defective because the gift is made to a cor-
poration not in existence at the time of the testator's death, if such cor-
poration is actually created within a reasonable time thereafter.5 There
are two classes of gifts falling into this category. One is a gift to an
organization not even informally in existence at the date of the will.
Thus, where there was a bequest to the German Red Cross Society for
the relief, use, and benefit of widows, orphans, and invalids, and no such
organization was functioning at the testator's death, the bequest was
held to create a valid charitable gift to such an organization when it
was created two years later. 6 The other is a gift to an unincorporated
association which is later incorporated,7 e.g., to the Denver Foundation
for the benefit of the needy people of Denver, 8 or to the Council at
Narragansett Pier, Rhode Island, of the Boy Scouts of America to aid
in carrying on its work.9 In both types of instances the courts have
endeavored to carry out the intent of the testator.
A trust will not be allowed to fail for lack of a trustee,10 or for
failure to use technical language expressing a trust purpose," if it is
otherwise clear that a trust was ihtended.12 This intent will be found
where the object as expressed is not opposed to the provisions or the
policy of the law,13 would be valuable educationally, would reasonably
tend to promote the general welfare of the community, and could be best
administered through the trust device. In such instances a charitable
'Keith v. Scales, 124 N. C. 497, 32 S. E. 809 (1899) (to the Moravian church
of Salem for a church and school) ; It re Durham's Estate, 203 Iowa 497, 211
N. W. 358 (1926) (to the Original Chapter of the Salvation Army located in
Council Bluffs, Iowa) ; In re Rahn's Estate, 316 Mo. 492, 291 S. W. 120, 51 A. L. R.
877 (1927) (German Red Cross case discussed in text) ; RESTATEMENT, TRUSTS
(1935) §401, comment k; ZOLLMAN, AMERICAN LAW OF CHARITIES (1924) §§345,
346.
'In re Rahn's Estate, 316 Mo. 492, 291 S. W. 120 (1927).
'ZOLLMAN, AMERICAN LAW OF CHARITIES (1924) §347.
'Jeffreys v. Trust Co., 97 Colo. 188, 48 P. (2d)' 1019 (1935), (1935) 8 RocKxY
MT. L. Rxv. 159 (1935).
'Tillinghast v. Council at Narrangansett Pier, 47 R. I. 406, 133 Atl. 662
(1926), 46 A. L. R. 827 (1927).
20 N. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1935) §§4023, 4035(a) ; State v. Gerard, 37 N. C.
210 (1842); Goodrum v. Goodrum, 43 N. C. 313 (1852); Keith v. Scales, 124
N. C. 497, 32 S. E. 809 (1899) ; Church v. Trustees, 158 N. C. 119, 73 S. E. 810(1912) ; Benevolent Society v. Orrell, 195 N. C. 405, 142 S. E. 493 (1928) (a trus-
tee may be appointed either by virtue of the statute or by the superior court in the
exercise of its equitable jurisdiction) ; RESTATEMENT, TRUSTS (1935) §397 (will not
fail for want of trustee unless settlor manifests an intention that trust shall not
arise unless person named acts as trustee); 2 BOGERT, TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES(1935) §328, n. 21; ZOLLMAN, AMERICAN LAW OF CHAgRiIEs (1924) §459, n. 17;
Note (1920) 5 A. L. R. 315.
"Benevolent Society v. Orrell, 195 N. C. 405, 142 S. E. 493 (1928) ; RESTATE-
MENT, TRUSTS (1935) §351, comment b; ZoLLmAN, AMERIcAN" LAW OF CHARITIES
(1924) §462.
"RESTATEMENT, TRUSTS (1935) §351; 2 BOGERT, TRUSTS AND TRUsTEES (1935)§324.
.
3Trust Co. v. Oghurn, 181 N. C. 324, 107 S. E. 238 (1921), (1922) 1 N. C. L,
R~v. 41.
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trust would seem more nearly to comply with the testator's intention
than an absolute gift.14
It is axiomatic that the beneficiaries of a charitable trust must be
incapable of definite ascertainment. 15 The objects and purposes, how-
ever, must be sufficiently concrete to enable the court to frame a decree
and to supervise the trust. 16 That is not to say, however, that the trustee
may not be given discretion to choose the methods and persons through
which the charitable purpose or object is to be effectuated.' 7 Decisions
to the contrary' 8 in North Carolina have been in effect overruled by
the statutet9 enacted in 1925. This statute also extends the area within
which the trustee may be given the choice, from one marked by the
word "charitable" used as a technical word of art, to one which shall
include "benevolent uses."20 And it establishes a public policy in favor
of the liberal construction of "religious, educational, charitable or ben-
evolent uses," by providing that "no gift, grant, bequest or devise,
whether in trust or otherwise," to such uses, "shall be invalid by reason
of any indefiniteness or uncertainty of the object or beneficiaries of such
trust, or because said instrument confers upon the trustee.., discretion-
ary powers in the selection and designation of the objects or beneficiaries
... or in carrying out the purpose thereof."
2
'
' Cf. St. James Parish v. Bagley, 138 N. C. 384, 50 S. E. 841 (1905) (to church
corporation for -home for widows and orphans or other religious and charitable
purposes).
RESTATEMENT, TRUSTS (1935) §§364, 375 (a trust is not a charitable trust if
the persons who are to benefit are not of a sufficiently large or indefinite class so
that the community as a whole is interested in the enforcement of the trust) ;
ZOLLMAN, Ai~mCAN LAW OF CHARITIES (1924) §353, n. 7 (the greatest of all
solecisms in law, morals, or religion is the supposition of a charity to individuals
personally known and selected by the giver) ; see 2 BoGERT, TRusTS AND TRUSTEES
(1935) §362.
'Haywood v. Craven's Ex'rs, 4 N. C. 360 (1816); White v. University, 39
N. C. 19 (1845) ; Miller v. Atldnson, 63 N. C. 537 (1869) ; Trust Co. v. Ogburn,
181 N. C. 324, 107 S. E. 238 (1921); ZOLLMAN, AmlRicAN LAW OF CHARITIES
(1924) §356.
1 ZOLLMAx, AMEmICA LAW OF CHARITIES (1924) §§434, 435.
Holland v. Peck, 37 N. C. 255 (1842) (to the Methodist Episcopal Church to
be disposed of by members of the conference as they shall in their Godly wisdom
judge will be most beneficial for the increase or prosperity of the gospel) ; Hester
v. Hester, 37 N. C. 330 (1842) (to some promising young man of good talents
and of the Baptist Order, at the discretion of my executors) ; Thomas v. Clay,
187 N. C. 778, 122 S. E. 852 (1924) (to my trustee to be invested by him in such
worthy objects of charity as he determine upon as being in accord with what "my
wishes and tastes in that direction were when living").
" N. C. CoDE ANN. (Michie, 1935) §4035(a) ; Legis. (1926) 4 N. C. L. Rav. 15.
Morice v. Bishop of Durham, 10 Ves. 521 (1805) ; In re Cunningham's Will,
206 N. Y. 601, 100 N. E. 437 (1912) (effect of similar statute in New York);
ZOLLMAN, AMERICAN LA w o- CHARITIES (1924) §§54, 55, 56, 401.
Although four cases prior to the principal case, have referred to the statute
since its enactment, none of them has indicated its effect upon the law of charities.
Benevolent Society v. Orrell, 195 N. C. 405, 142 S. E. 493 (1928) ; Hass v. Hass,
195 N. C. 734, 143 S. E. 541 (1928); Whitsett v. Clapp, 200 N. C. 647, 158 S. E.
183 (1931) ; Humphrey v. Board of Trustees, 203 N. C. 201, 165 S. E. 547 (1932),(1933) 11 N. C. L. REv. 179. It is believed that the statement in (1926) 4 N. C.
L. REv. 15, to the effect that the statute was intended to establish Cy Pres in
North Carolina, is erroneous.
THE NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
In the principal case the view that a gift and not a trust was in-
tended is perhaps justified by the fact that if a trust were intended only
the income on the $1,000 would be available for the use specified, and
such income would be a negligible amount; whereas if a gift were in-
tended, the full $1,000 would be available. However, the court dis-
cusses at length the validity of the bequest as a trust, and indicates that
it is void as such. In so doing in the light of the considerations men-
tioned in the foregoing discussion, the court unnecessarily confuses the
law of charitable trusts in North Carolina. The statute of 1925 and its
effects upon the earlier decisions relied on are not mentioned. The
opinion gives the impression that it is still legally impossible for the
trustee of an otherwise valid charitable trust in this state to be given
discretionary powers to select the particular objects and individuals to
be benefitted. And it betrays unawareness of the extent to which the
courts may, upon contests such as that in the principal case, or upon a
petition for instructions, or at the suit of the Attorney General, super-
vise the administration by the charitable trustee.22
Wm. R. DAWES.
Criminal Law-Evidence--Admissibility of Evidence of a
Collateral Offense of Defendant to Prove the
Offense Charged.
D was indicted with state's witness for conspiracy to rob by means
of assault with firearms or other dangerous weapons, and for robbery
in pursuance of the conspiracy. As proof of the conspiracy the lower
court admitted in evidence testimony that a week after the alleged rob-
bery state's witness and D conspired to burn, and did burn, an auto-
mobile to defraud an insurance company. This evidence was admitted
to show identity and guilty knowledge,' and the Supreme Court affirmed
the lower court ruling.2
It is the general rule that a particular crime cannot be proved by
evidence of a distinct, substantive, unconnected collateral offense.8 The
strict application of this rule is obviously desirable. Not only does ev-
idence of other crimes committed by D tend to prejudice and mislead
the jury, but also D might be taken by surprise and be unprepared to
answer the accusation, if innocent, or, if guilty, be unable to mitigate its
effect upon the outcome of the trial for the offense charged in the
IN. C. CODE ANx. (Michie, 1935) §§4033, 4034; Tillinghast v. Council at
Narragansett Pier, 47 R. I. 406, 133 At. 662, 46 A. L. R. 827 (1927) (court set
up a trust until council incorporated).
I Record on Appeal, pp. 57, 351, State v. Flowers, 211 N. C 721, 192 S. E. 110
(1937).
State v. Flowers, 211 N. C 721, 192 S. E. 110 (1937).
People v. Molyneaux, 168 N, Y. 264, 61 N. E. 286 (1901), 62 L, R. A. 193
(1904).
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indictment.4 There are, however, certain well recognized exceptions
to this general rule. If a collateral offense of D will tend to show guilty
knowledge, intent, identity, malice or motive, plan or design, or if the
collateral offense is part of the res gestac of the crime charged, evidence
of the collateral crime is admissible.5 In all cases, however,, there must
be a sufficient connection between the two crimes so that evidence of
the collateral crime will tend to establish D's guilt of the one charged.6
The North Carolina Court follows the general rule and its exceptions.7
'State v. Beam, 184 N. C. 730, 115 S. E. 176 (1922).
See note 3, supra; 1 WIGMORF, EVmENCE (2d ed. 1923) §§300-306.
See cases cited infra note 7. Each of these cases supports this statement
either expressly or impliedly.
'A-Evidence of a collateral offense by D has been held inadmissible:
State v. Shuford, 69 N. C. 486 (1873) (where in a trial of D for mur-
der of her newly born baby evidence of a similar previous offense was
offered) ; State v. Norton, 82 N. C. 629 (1880) (where in a trial of D
for assault and battery, supposedly with a pistol, evidence that two weeks
prior D had exhibited a pistol, and made threatening remarks about
prosecuting witness, was offered); State v. Jeffries, 117 N. C. 727, 23
S. E. 163 (1895) (where D was tried for pledging a bicycle already cov-
ered by a mortgage, and evidence was offered that he attempted to pledge
a wagon, five months later, also covered by the same mortgage) ; State
v. Frazier, 118 N. C. 1257, 24 S. E. 520 (1896) (where in a trial of D
for larceny of money he had given prosecutrix, evidence was introduced
that he had previously seduced prosecutrix, as it was not shown that
the money had been given to her because of the seduction); State v.
Graham, 121 N. C. 623, 28 S. E. 409 (1897) (where in a trial of D for
burning his lessor's house, after taking out insurance on the furniture
therein, evidence of a similar previous offense was offered); State v.
Beam, 184 N. C. 730, 115 S. E. 176 (1922) (where in a trial of D for
selling liquor evidence that D had sold liquor eleven years before was
offered) ; State v. Smith, 204 N. C. 638, 169 S. E. 23(Y (1933) (where in
a trial for breaking into a store and stealing therefrom evidence was of-
fered that a store in another county, but belonging to the same people,
was broken into, and goods found in D's place seemed to be those taken
from the stores) ; State v. Jordan, 207 N. C. 460, 177 S. E. 333 (1934)
(where irk a trial of D for knowingly receiving stolen goods evidence was
offered that D sold liquor).
B-Evidence of a collateral offense has been held inadmissible because of
lack of connection between D and the collateral offense:
State v. Freeman, 49 N. C. 5 (1856) (where in a trial of a servant
for setting a house on fire evidence was offered of two previous fires
with which D was not shown to be connected) ; State v. Alston, 94 N. C.
930 (1886) (where in a trial of D for burning a barn evidence merely,
intimating that D was connected with another barn fire was offered) ;
State v. McCall, 131 N. C. 798, 42 S. E. 894 (1902) (where in a trial of
D for burning a church evidence was offered concerning the burning of a
mill by D's father just previously) ; State v. Fowler, 172 N. C. 905, 90
S. E. 408 (1916) (where on a charge of breaking into a building and
stealing therefrom evidence of other similar crimes in the same neighbor-
hood was offered, but no connection was shown between D and the other
crimes) ; State v. Deadmon, 195 N. C. 705, 143 S. E, 514 (1928) (where
in a trial of D for burning a barn to collect insurance evidence was of-
fered that another barn of D's had burned).
C-Evidence of a collateral offense by D has been held admissible as .part of
the res gtstae:
State v. Murphy, 84 N. C. 742 (1881) (where in a trial of D for
stealing prosecutor's pig evidence was offered that someone else found his
stolen pig in D's pen at the time prosecuting witness found his there) ;
State v. Mace, 118 N. C. 1244, 24 S. E. 798 (1896) (where in a trial of D
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for murder evidence was offered that D prevented witness from notifying
deceased's family by means of an assault with a gun) ; State v. Adams, 138
N. C. 688, 50 S. E. 765 (1905) (where D was tried for murder and
evidence was offered of serious injury inflicted on deceased's children at
the same time).
D-Evidence of a collateral offense -by D has been held admissible to show
intent:
State v. Parrish, 104 N. C. 679, 10 S. E. 457 (1889) (where D was
indicted for rape of his daughter and evidence of previous forcible inter-
course was introduced); State v. Register, 133 N. C. 747, 46 S. E. 21(1903) (where in a trial for murder committed in an alleged attempt to
rob evidence of the conspiracy to rob was offered) ; State v. Hight, 150
N. C. 817, 63 S. E. 1043 (1909) (where D was tried for embezzlement
of watches and evidence of similar offenses over a period of the preced-
ing two years was offered) ; Stpttq v. Plyler, 153 N. C. 630, 69 S. E. 269
(1910) (where in a trial of. D for murder evidence that he had shortly
before shot at deceased was offered. The court held this was admissible
to show motive.); State v. Boynton, 155 N. C. 456, 71 S. E. 341 (1911)
(where in a trial of D for selling liquor evidence that he habitually kept
liquor on hand for purpose of sale was offered) ; State v. Leak, 156 N. C.
643, 72 S. E. 567 (1911) (where D was tried for assault with intent to
rape and evidence of another assault on prosecuting witness, on the same
day, was offered) ; Gray v. Cartwright, 174 N. C. 49, 93 S. E. 432 (1917)
(where in a trial of D for malicious prosecution of P for stealing a cow
evidence of other thefts of cattle by P was offered) ; State v. Simons,
178 N. C. 679, 100 S. E. 239 (1919) (discussed in body of comment);
State v. Stancill, 178 N. C. 683, 100 S. E. 241 (1919) (discussed in body
of comment); State v. Haywood, 182 N. C. 815, 108 S. E. 726 (1921)
(where on indictment for keeping liquor for purpose of sale evidence of
previous sales of liquor was offered) ; State v. Crouse, 182 N. C. 835,
108 S. E. 911 (1921) (where in a trial of D for possession of liquor for
purpose of sale evidence that a still, which had been worked the preced-
ing night, was found ninety days prior on D's land was offered); State
v. Pannil, 182 N. C. 838, 109 S. E. 1 (1921) (where in a trial of D for
stealing oats, and receiving same, evidence that other stolen goods from
prosecutor's place were found in D's place was offered); State v. Dail,
191 N. C. 231, 131 S. E. 573 (1926) (where in a trial of D for stealing
an auto, and receiving same with felonious intent, evidence that the car
was used by D and his friends, who were staying at his home, in precon-
ceived burglaries was offered); State v. Hardy, 209 N. C. 83, 182 S. E.
831 (1935) (where D was tried for receiving, possessing, and transport-
ing liquor for the purpose of sale, and evidence that liquor was found in
a previous search of D's premises was offered) ; State v. Batts, 210 N. C.
659, 188 S. E. 99 (1936) (discussed in body of comment).
E-Evidence of a collateral offense by D has been held admissible to show
system or design:
State v. Wilkerson, 98 N. C. 696, 3 S. E. 683 (1897) (where D, a
county official, was tried for owrongfully obtaining money from the county
for a pauper, and evidence that D continued to get the money after the
pauper had moved out of the county andhad died was offered) ; State v.
Hight, 150 N. C. 817, 63 S. E. 1043 (1909) (facts given supra D) ; State
v. Winner, 153 N. C. 602,. 69 S. E. 9 (1910) (where in a trial of D for
selling liquor evidence of other sales in the same place in a similar manner
was offered); State v. Stancill, 178 N. C. 683, 100 S. E. 241 (1919)(discussed in body of comment).
F-Evidence of a collateral offense'has been held admissible to show identity:
These cases are discussed in the body of the comment.
G--Evidence of a collateral offense has been held admissible to show guilty
knowledge:
State v. Twitty, 9 N. C. 248 (1822) (where in, trial of D for passing
counterfeit money evidence of previous possession of counterfeit bills on
many occasions was offered); State v. Murphy, 84 N. C. 742 (1881)
(facts given supra C) ; State v. Wilkerson, 98 N. C. 696, 3 S. E. 683(1887) (facts given supra E) ; State v. Walton, 114 N. C. 783, 18 S. E.
945 (1894) (where in a trial of D for obtaining money under false pre-
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In the opinion in the principal case the general rule with its ex-
ceptions is set forth, and then the Court merely holds8 that the evidence
of the state "comes well within the exceptions to the general rule, as
recognized and applied in State v. Batts...,9 State v. Ray...,'0 State v.
Stancill..,11 State v. Simons....,12 The Court does not indicate under
which exception(s) the evidence is admitted, but a reference to the lower
court record shows that the evidence was admitted to show identity
and guilty knowledge in the conspiracy charge.13 It is difficult to see
just how the question of guilty knowledge is involved, because if D
were shown to have conspired to rob it would be unnecessary to prove
that he knew of the wrongful nature of the act. Use of the term "guilty
knowledge" seems to have been a terminological slip on the part of
the Court, and in all probability the testimony was allowed only to show
the identity of the D as one of the conspirators.
However, the above-mentioned cases on which the Court relied for
its holding do not seem to support the Court's decision. In State v.
Batts'4 D was tried for criminal conspiracy to wreck and damage his
automobile with intent to defraud an insurance company. Evidence
that a witness had seen D deliberately damage another of his auto-
mobiles and put in a claim therefor was held admissible on the question
of intent. In State v. Ray,' 5 wherein D was charged with knowingly re-
ceiving stolen cigarettes, evidence was admitted to show that shortly
before and after the transaction charged in the indictment D received
other stolen cigarettes. This evidence was held competent to show
tenses evidence of other similar offenses was offered); State v. Winner,
153 N. C. 602, 69 S. E. 9 (1910) (facts given supra E); State v. Boynton,
155 N. C. 456, 71 S. E. 341 (1911) (facts given supra D) ; Greensboro
Life Ins. Co. v. Knight, 160 N. C. 592, 76 S. E. 623 (1912) (where in a
trial of D, an insurance agent, for fraudulent misrepresentation, evidence
that he had made the same representations to others was offered. Appar-
ently there was no prior indictable offense, yet in admitting the ev-
idence the court treated the problem as if there were.) ; State v. Min-
cher, 178 N. C. 698, 100 S. E., 339 (1919) (where in a trial of a prison
guard for receiving stolen goods from a "trusty" under his supervision ev-
idence was offered that D allowed the "trusty" to overstay his leave,
that the "trusty" stole the goods, and that D subscribed to a newspaper
which carried the story and description of the stolen articles. Again
apparently there was no prior indictable offense, yet in admitting the
evidence the court treated the problem as if there were.); State v.
Dail, 191 N. C. 231, 131 S. -E. 573 (1926) (facts given supra D) ; State
v. Hildebran, 201 N. C. 780, 161 S. E. 488 (1931) (where in a trial of
D for conducting a bawdy house evidence that the inmates had previously
been lewd and boisterous in their actions was offered) ; State v. Ray, 209
N. C. 772, 184 S. E. 836 (1936) (discussed in body of comment).
'State v. Flowers, 211 N. C. 721, 724, 192 S. E. 110, 112 (1937).
p210 N. C. 659, 188 S. E. 99 (1936).
"209 N. C. 772, 184 S. E. 836 (1936).
"178 N. C. 683, 100 S. E. 241 (1919).
"178 N. C 679, 100 S. E. 239 (1919).
'Record on Appeal, pp. 57, 351, State v. Flowers, 211 N. C. 721, 192 S. E. 110
(193e7) note 9, supra. "See note 10, supra.
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guilty knowledge. In State v. Stancil'16 D was tried for stealing tobacco,
and evidence that he had previously stolen tobacco in the same neigh-
borhood was admitted to prove intent and design or plan. In State v.
SiMons' z D was indicted for having whiskey for sale in violation of
law. Evidence that about a month later D was caught working on a
new still was held admissible to show intent. In not one of the above
cases is the question of identity involved. In each of these cases there
was no question about D's having done the acts involved in both the
collateral offense and the offense charged, and the only question was
the intention or state of mind of the accused at the time of the crime
charged. This differs from the principal case in which the evidence
of the collateral crime was for the purpose of proving that D was con-
nected or identified with the crime charged, and because of this dif-
ference, cases under the exceptions for intent and guilty knowledge do
not logically support cases involving the exception for identity.
In those North Carolina cases which have dealt with the admis-
sibility of evidence of another distinct offense to prove identity there
has been a fairly obvious connection between the collateral crime and
the one charged which indicated strongly that if D were engaged in the
commission of the collateral crime he was also involved in the one
charged. This connection is illustrated in the following situations: (1)
In the trial of D for setting fire to an outhouse evidence that a dwelling
house fifteen feet away was fired at the same time, in the same manner,
and by faggots bound with D's rope, was held admissible.' 8 (2) In a
trial of D for breaking and entering a house and stealing therefrom,
evidence of the possession of the stolen goods soon after the robbery
was held admissible.' 9 (3) Evidence was admitted, in a trial of D's
for burning a barn, that their footprints led from the barn to the site
of a mill fire which occurred the same night, and with which the D's
were connected by other evidence. 20 (4) In a trial of D for secret
assault evidence was admitted that a short time prior to the offense
charged D had shot at the prosecuting witness' home, and had threat-
ened to shoot the prosecuting witness.21 (5) In a trial of D for mur-
der, committed in the course of a robbery, evidence that D had pre-
viously ridden around often with those known to have been involved,
and had committed several robberies with them, was held competent.22
In the principal case the connection between the collateral offense
and the one charged is not as strong, and the relevancy is questionable.
The two conspiracies are so fundamentally different that evidence of
"See note 11, supra. 1 See note 12, supra.
I State v. Thompson, 97 N. C 496, 1 S. E, 921 (1887).
"State v. Weaver, 104 N. C. 758, 10 S. E. 486 (1889) ; State v. Hullen, 133
N. C. 656, 45 S. E. 513 (1903).
' State v. Griffith, 185 N. C. 756, 117 S. E. 586 (1923).
-' State v. Miller, 189 N. C. 695, 128 S. E. 1 (1925).
' State v. Ferrell, 205 N. C. 640, 172 S. E. 186 (1933).
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complicity in one is extremely weak evidence of identity with the other.
The principal case, then, is apparently unsupported by the cases cited
by the court, and seems definitely out of line with prior decisions involv-
ing the use of testimony as to other offenses to prove identity.
JOSEPH M. KITTNER.
Declaratory Judgments-Insurance.
Plaintiff, insurer, issued life policies to defendant, the insured, pro-
viding for waiver of premiums and payment of benefits in the event of
the insured's becoming disabled. Having refused to allow repeated
claims for disability benefits, the insurer sought declaratory relief in a
federal court to the effect that the insured was not disabled and that
the policies were void for non-payment of premiums. Held, by the
Supreme Court, the Federal Declaratory Judgment Act1 is constitu-
tional, and a controversy was presented in which the insurer was en-
titled to declaratory relief.2
In spite of three adverse Supreme Court dicta,3 it has been assumed
generally that the Federal Declaratory Judgment Act, if invoked in an
actual controversy, 4 is valid. This assumption has found support in
numerous decisions of state courts sustaining, similar legislation, 5 in the
Supreme Court's apparent change of attitude in Nashville, Chattanooga,
and St. Louis Ry. v. Wallace,6 and in favorable decisions in the lower
federal courts.7 The principal case is, however, the first square hold-
ing by the Supreme Court that the Federal Act is constitutional. The
decision is equally significant as an indication of the increasing utility
of the declaratory judgment in insurance cases.8
148 STAT. 955 (1934) as amended 49 STAT. 1027 (1935), 28 U. S. C. A. §400
(Supp. 1936). Compare with North Carolina Declaratory Judgment Act, N. C.
CODE ANN. (Michie, 1935) §628.
'Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U. S. 227, 57 Sup. Ct. 461, 81 L. ed.
Adv. Ops. 394 (1937).
'Liberty Warehouse Co. v. Grannis, 273 U. S. 70, 47 Sup. Ct. 282, 71 L. ed.
541 (1927); Liberty Warehouse Co. v. Burley Tobacco Growers' Co6perative
Marketing Ass'n, 276 U. S. 71, 88, 48 Sup. Ct. 291, 294, 72 L. ed. 473, 479 (1928) ;
Willing v. Chicago Auditorium Ass'n, 277 U. S. 274, 289, 48 Sup. Ct. 507, 509,
72 L. ed. 880, 884 (1928). Cases criticized, Borchard, The Supreme Court and
the Declaratory Judgment (1928) 14 A. B. A. J. 633, 635.
' U. S. CoNsT. Art. III, §2; Muskrat v. United States, 219 U. S. 346, 31 Sup.
Ct. 250, 55 L. ed. 246 (1911). The Federal Act, cited supra note 1, limits the
power to grant declaratory judgments to "cases of actual controversy."
'State v. Grove, 109 Kan. 619, 201 Pac. 82 (1921); Board of Education v.
Van Zandt, 119 Misc. 124, 195 N. Y. Supp. 297 (1922) ; Carolina Power and Light
Co. v. Iseley, 203 N. C. 811, 167 S. E. 56 (1933); Petition of Kariher, 284 Pa.
455, 131 Atl. 265 (1925).
8288 U. S. 249, 264, 53 Sup. Ct. 345, 348, 77 L. ed. 730, 736 (1933) (declaratoryjudgment under Tennessee Statute held to be entitled to review in the Supreme
Court).I
'Commercal Casualty Co. v. Plummer, 13 F. Supp. 169 (S. D. Tex. 1935);
Gully v. Interstate Natural Gas Co., 82 F. (2d) 145 (C. C. A. 5th, 1936).
8 For a more extended treatment of the declaratory judgment and the insurance
contract see: Morrison, Availability of the Federal Declaratory Judgment Act for
Life Insurance Cases (1937) 23 A. B. A. J. 788; comment (1936) 46 YALE L. J.
286.
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An insurance policy may be invalid because of fraud or misrepre-
sentation in its procurement, or it may lapse for breach of conditions or
non-payment of premiums. Whatever the cause of the policy's becom-
ing inoperative, where there is a dispute between insurer and insured
as to its validity, it is to the advantage of the insurer to secure a final
adjudication of the dispute as soon as possible. The insurer may notify
the insured of the rescission of the policy, but if the insured denies the
insurer's right to rescind and there is any doubt about the matter, the
insurer is forced to maintain reserves to cover the policy until its action
has been upheld by the courts. In the principal case the policies would
continue in force under the waiver clause, in spite of failure to pay the
premiums, if the insured were actually disabled. But the insured de-
layed bringing suit for disability benefits, and the question- of his dis-
ability remained undetermined. Although the Statute of Limitations
would begin to run against the insured as to the disability benefits, it
would not operate against the beneficiary until the latter's cause of
action should accrue upon the death of the insured. The insured might
not die until twenty or thirty years later, and at his death the beneficiary
might bring an action on the policy, prove that the insured was disabled,
that payment of premiums was unnecessary, and thus recover from the
insurer. Throughout those years the insurer would have to set aside
reserves to cover the policy and, unless permitted to take the initiative
in bringing the controversy 'before the courts, would have to await
passively an action by the other parties. Meanwhile many of its im-
portant witnesses might die or disappear and the memory of those re-
maining would be dimmed by the passage of time,9 with the result that
its defenses would become materially weakened.' 0
Before the enactment of declaratory judgment statutes the remedy
of the insurer was the bill in equity for cancellation. But equitable
relief was available only when the remedy at law was inadequate." In
order to show this inadequacy it was not sufficient to prove fraud or
misrepresentation in procurement of the policy' 2 or that the insured
'The insurer might be protected to some extent by a bill to perpetuate testi-
mony or its equivalent under the codes. N. C. CODE ANx. (Michie, 1938)
§1822(1)-(4); McINToSH, NORTH CAROLINA PRACTcE AND PROCEDURE (1929)
§985; WALSH, EQuirk (1930) §116.
" An even more serious dilemma is presented by the disputed policy when it
has been issued by a mutual company, in which the policy-holder is entitled to a
voice in the management and a share in *the profits. Until disputes of this kind
are adjudicated there is a problem as to which policy-holders are entitled to vote
in elections and share in the surplus of the company.
n Note (1935) 97 A. L. R. 572.
2 Phoenix Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Bailey, 13 Wallace 616, 20 L. ed. 501 (1871)
Cable v. United States Life Ins. Co., 191 U. S. 288, 24 Sup. Ct. 74, 48 L. ed. 188
(1903); Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Smith, 73 Fed. 318 (C. C. E. D. N. C. 1896);
N. Y. Life Ins. Co. v. Miller, 73 F. (2d) 350 (C. C. A. 8th, 1934); Globe Mutual
Life Ins. Co. v. Reals, 79 N. Y. 202 (1879). Contra: John Hancock Mutual Life
Ins. Co. v. Dick, 114 Mich. 337, 72 N. W. 179 (1897). Cancellation has also been
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had defaulted in payment of premiums.' 3 It was necessary, in addition,
to prove special circumstances under which the insurer would suffer
not merely inconvenience but irreparable injury if left to its defenses.' 4
Such circumstances could be proved by showing that the policy con-
tained an incontestable clause,15 for unless the insurer were allowed to
sue in equity before the expiration of the contestable period he would
be in danger of losing forever his right to contest upon grounds covered
by the clause. The incontestable clause does not apply where the policy
is contested for non-payment of premiums or breach of condition sub-
sequent, and in such cases the presence of the clause in the policy does
not make the remedy at law inadequate.
Insurance companies have sought to obtain through the declaratory
judgment a more complete remedy than that afforded by the bill to can-
cel. The declaratory judgment provides a speedy and effective method
of determining whether insurance policies are valid and operative by
allowing the insurer to take the initiative in obtaining an adjudication
of the issues. Policy-holders and beneficiaries have no legitimate com-
plaint against its use since the right of jury trial upon questions of fact
is specifically provided.' 6 The public, as well as the insurer, has a vital
interest in the efficient management of insurance companies, and both
should benefit by the elimination of uncertainty and delay. In deciding
upon the applicability of the declaratory judgment to suits by the in-
surer to determine its liability upon a policy, courts have been faced
with three problems: (1) whether such a suit presents an actual con-
troversy, (2) whether a declaration of immunity from liability is a
declaration of "rights and other legal relations,"' 7 and (3) whether the
availability of another remedy precludes declaratory relief.
refused on the grounds of an adequate remedy at law in Griesa v. Mutual Life
Ins. Co., 169 Fed. 509 (C. C. A. 8th, 1909) (where insured committed suicide)
and in Imperial Fire Ins. Co. v. Gunning, 81 Il. 236 (1876) (where policy-holder
set fire to insured property).
'Bank Savings Life Ins. Co. v. Wood, 122 Kan. 831, 253 Pac. 431 (1927);
Globe Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Reals, 79 N. Y. 202 (1879).
'"The danger of loss of testimony is not sufficient to make the remedy at law
inadequate. Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Smith, 73 Fed. 318 (C. C. E. D. N. C.
1896); Nat. Life and Accident Ins. Co. v. Propst, 219 Ala. 437, 122 So. 656(1929) ; Town of Venice v. Woodruff, 62 N. Y. 462 (1875) (action by municipal-
ity to cancel bonds) ; Globe Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Reals, 79 N. Y. 202 (1879).
Contra: Conn. Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Home Ins. Co., 6 Fed. Cas. No. 3,107
(C. C. D. Conn. 1879).
N. Y. Life Ins. Co. v. Siymour, 45 F. (2d) 47 (C. C. A. 6th, 1930) ; N. Y.
Life Ins. Co. v. Rigas, 117 Conn. 437, 168 Atl. 22 (1933) ; Travelers' Ins. Co. v.
Snydecker, 127 Misc. 66, 215 N. Y. Supp. 277 (1926) ; see Am. Trust Co. v. Life
Ins. Co. of Va., 173 N. C. 558, 567, 92 S. E. 706, 711; note (1931) 73 A. L. R.
1529.
"48 STAT. 955 (1934) as amended 49 STAT. 1027 (1935), 28 U. S. C. A. §400
(3) (Supp. 1936).
2748 STAT. 955 (1934) as amended 49 STAT. 1027 (1935), 28 U. S. C. A. §400
(1) (Supp. 1936).
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The principal case decides that in such suits an actual controversy
exists and that a declaration of non-liability is a declaration of "rights
and other legal relations." The third problem has caused the greatest
confusion among the state and lower federal courts. A number of
courts have applied equity rules to petitions for declaratory judgments,
refusing relief where there is a so-called adequate remedy at law,1 8
and requiring the insurer to wait and defend a future suit. Other
courts, taking a more practical view of the situation, have refused to
apply such a restriction. 9 The provision in the statute for declarations
"whether or not further relief is or could be prayed" 20 and the result
in the principal case, although the issue was not raised, would seem to
indicate that the existence of another remedy is no absolute bar.
Although the availability of another remedy should not, as a matter
of law, automatically bar a declaratory judgment, the fact of its ex-
istence may be properly considered by the court in determining whether,
in the exercise of its sound discretion, it should refuse declaratory re-
lief. In Aetna Casualty and Surety Co. v. Quarles,21 the insurer asked
for a declaration that it was not liable to a judgment creditor of the
insured, holder of an automobile liability policy. A suit by the judg-
ment creditor against the insurer, as provided in the policy, was already
pending.- The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals held a refusal to grant
a declaratory judgment under the circumstances to be a proper exercise
of judicial discretion.
The extent of the courts' discretion to refuse relief under the Fed-
' Western Casualty and Surety Co. v. Beverforden, 17 F. Supp. 928 (W. D.
Mo. 1936); Columbia Nat. Life Ins. Co. v. Foulke, 13 F. Supp. 350 (W. D. Mo.
1936), rezd, 89 F. (2d) 261 (C. C. A. 8th, 1937); Associated Indemnity Corp. v.
Manning, 16 F. Supp. 430 (W. D. Wash. 1936) semble; Brindley v. Meara, 198 N. E.
301 (Ind. 1935) (dispute between advisory board and trustee of township) ; Mer-
chants' Mutual Casualty Co. v. Leone, 9 N. E. (2d) 553 (Mass. 1937) ; Wolverine
Mutual Motor, Ins. Co. v. Clark, 277 Mich. 633, 270 N. W. 167 (1936); Stewart
v. Herten, 125 Neb. 210, 249 N. W. 552 (1933) (involving appointment of guard-
ian); Reynolds v. Chase, 177 Atl. 291 (N. H. 1935) (involving construction and
validity of contract); see Babcock v. Babcock, 147 Misc. 900, 903, 265 N. Y.
Supp. 470, 474 (1933) (alimony suit).
Equitable Life Assurance Soc. v. Templeton, 19. F. Supp. 485 (E. D. S. C.
1936); Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Williams, 88 F. (2d) 929 (C. C. A. 8th, 1937);
Columbia Nat. Life Ins. Co. v. Foulke, 89 F. (2d) 261 (C. C. A. 8th, 1937);
Anderson v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 89 F. (2d) 345 (C. C. A. 4th, 1937) ; Stephenson
v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc. (C. C. A. 4th, Sept. 29, 1937) (suit by insured
against insurer). Declaratory judgments have been held proper, without discus-
sion of the effect of the availability of other remedies, in the following suits
by the insurer where the remedy at law would be considered adequate: Ohio
Casualty Co. v. Plummer, 13 F. Supp. 169" (S. D. Tex. 1935) ; Commercial Cas-
ualty Co. v. Humphrey, 13 F. Supp. 174 (S. D. Tex. 1935); Travelers' Ins. Co.
v. Helmer, 15 F. Supp. 355 (N. D. Ga. 1936); Travelers' Ins. Co. v. Young, 18
F. Supp. 450 (D. N. J. 1937); American Motorists' Ins. Co. v. Central Garage,
86 N. H. 362, 169 Ati. 121 (1933); Glens Falls Indemnity Co. v. Keliher, 187
Atl. 473 (N. H. 1936). See BORCHARD, DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS (1934) 149.
1'48 STAT. 955 (1934) as amended 49 STAT. 1027 (1935), 2S U. S. C. A. §400
(1) (Supp. 1936).
C. C. A. 4th, Sept. 29, 1937.
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eral Declaratory Judgment Act is not dear. Whatever discretion exists
is a judicial discretion subject to appellate review.22 The Uniform
Declaratory Judgment Act, which has been adopted in North Carolina,
makes refusal of declaratory relief discretionary where the uncertainty
or the controversy giving rise to the proceeding would not be ter-
minated.2s There is no such provision in the Federal Act, and it has
been strongly contended that the federal courts have no power to refuse
to entertain jurisdiction in the exercise of a discretion not based upon
an established rule of law. 24 In the Quarles case the court takes the
position that it is implied that the granting of declaratory judgments
shall rest in the court's discretion, since the statute merely gives the
court power to grant the remedy without prescribing conditions under
which it is to be granted. The possibility that the useful purpose of
declaratory judgment statutes may be defeated by an abuse of judicial
discretion is a danger that should be carefully guarded against. In the
Quarles case, however, the granting of a declaratory judgment after an
action had been brought against the insurer was unnecessary, and the
decision is to be commended as an intelligent exercise of the court's
discretion under the Federal Declaratory Judgment Act.
MOSEs BRAXTON GILLAM, JR.
Equity-Extent of Injunction Against Nuisances.
Plaintiffs petitioned to enjoin as a nuisance a roadhouse situated in
plaintiffs' neighborhood. A dancing pavillion was operated in connec-
tion with the roadhouse where music was continuously played, and
where patrons remained throughout the night cursing, gambling, drink-
ing, and fighting. Notwithstanding the fact that some of the acts con-
nected with the operation of the business were legitimate, the decree
granted by the court enjoined the operation of the business in its en-
tirety.1
As shown by the principal case, a lawful business may become a
nuisance by reason of the manner of its operation. 2 In framing a decree
to enjoin such nuisances most courts in the absence of a statute hold that
there cannot be abatement to the extent of closing out the whole busi-
BORCHARD, DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS (1934) 100.
2 UNIFORM DECLARATORY JUDGMENT ACT §6, 9 UNIFORM LAWS ANN. 127;
N. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1935) §628(e).
" Morrison, Availability of the Federal Declaratory Judgment Act for Life
Insurance Cases (1937) 23 A. B. A. J. 788, 791.
1Hunnicutt v. Eaton, 191 S. E. 919 (Ga. 1937).
'Nevins v. McGavock, 214 Ala. 93, 106 So. 597 (1925) ; Junction City Lumber
Co. v. Sharp, 92 Ark. 538, 123 S. W. 370 (1909); Sullivan v. Royster, 72 Cal.
248, 13 Pac. 655 (1887) ; Gilbert v. Davidson Constr. Co., 110 Kan. 298, 203 Pac.
1113 (1922) ; Block v. Fertitta, 165 S. W. 504 (Tex. 1914) ; LEwIs AND SPELLING,
INJUNcTIONs (1926) §288.
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ness if a change in the character of its conduct will remove the evils.8
Only that part of the activity complained of which is offensive is en-
joined, and the defendant may continue his business if it can be sep-
arately conducted in a harmless way. Thus the following businesses
were held to be nuisances, but the decree in each case was framed so as
to enjoin only the illegal uses of the premises: a dance hall where the
patrons used loud, profane, and vulgar language ;4 a shoe shine parlor
where the negro boys employed were noisy and boisterous ;5 a dairy
which caused noise, odors, and pests; 6 an iron works which caused
noise;7 a woodwork company where there was loud shouting of work-
men and much smoke and noise ;s a filling station where there was noise
and confusion ;9 a poolroom where a large number of criminals, gam-
blers, and other low and dissolute characters congregated ;10 and a bar-
becue stand where the employees scuffled in a loud and boisterous
manner.'1
In declaring certain courses of action to be nuisances the legislatures
of many states have provided for injunctions of a more rigorous form
than those employed to suppress the above mentioned common law nui-
sances. Many states have passed statutes declaring houses of ill fame,
illicit liquor establishments, gambling houses, and other places which
foster conduct offensive to public morals to be nuisances.1 2 The statutes
may be roughly classified into the following two groups: 1. Where the
injunction is to be limited to the forbidden activity.18 2. Where the
entire business or place is to be dosed for all purposes.' 4 The statutes
of the vast majority of states including North Carolina are of the latter
class. Thus under these statutes courts have closed a cafe operated in
the same building with a house of prostitution,16 and an entire race track
'People v. High Ground Dairy Co., 166 N. Y. App. 81, 151 N. Y. Supp. 710
(1915).
'Kleising v. Miller, 83 S. W. (2d) 732 (Tex. 1935).
'Block v. Fertitta, 165 S. W. 504 (Tex. 1914).
'People v. High Ground Dairy Co., 166 N. Y. App. 81, 151 N. Y. Supp. 710(1915).
'Collins v. Wayne Iron Works, 227 Pa. 326, 76 Atl. 24 (1910).8Mackenzie v. Frank M. Pauli Co., 207 Mich. 456, 174 N. W. 161 (1919).
'National Refining Co. v. Batte, 135 Miss. 819, 100 So. 388 (1924).
"'Respass v. Commonwealth, 131 Ky. 807, 115 S. W. 1131 (1909).11Pig'n Whistle Sandwich Shops v. Keith, 167 Ga. 622, 146 S. E. 455 (1929).
", ALA. CODEAN. (Michie, 1928) §§9280-98; ARU. REv. CODE ANN. (Struckmeyer,
1928) §§2486-92; COLO. STAT. ANN. (Michie, 1935) Vol. 2, c. 1, §§1-11; DE. REv.
CODE (1935) §§5272-80; D. C. CODE (1930) tit. 6, §§184-93; FLA. Coifp. GEN. LAWS
ANN. (1927) §7832; IowA CoDE (1935) §§1587-1618; PA. STAT. (Purden, 1936)
tit. 68, §§467-73; S. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1932) §§575-83.
1337 OKLA. STrAT. ANN. (1937) §73. The statute is discussed in Gragg v.
State, 73 Okla. 132, 175 .Pac. 201 (1918); Ford v. State, 109 Okla. 79, 234 Pac.
635 (1925) ; PA. STAT. (Purden, 1936) tit. 68, §§467-73.
"ALA. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1928) §§9280-98; DEL. REV. CODE (1935) §§5272-
80; FLA. ComP. GEN. LAws ANN. (1927) §7832; N. C. CODE ANN. (Michie,
1935) §§3180-87; S. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1932) §§575-83.
"People v. Smith; 48 Cal. 251, 191 Pac. 996 (1920).
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where only the betting on the horses was illegal.1 6 Some of the statutes
under this class provide that so much. of any building or structure as
may be entered through the same outside entrance shall be closed.1 7 The
North Carolina statute and several others provide that the place en-
joined shall include any building, erection, or place or any separate part
or portion thereof, or the ground itself.1 8 In none of these statutes of
the second class is the' deprivation of the use of the property absolute.
For the owner may apply to the court for permission to reopen, and if it
is satisfied with his good faith he may reopen his business by posting a
bond conditioned that he will immediately abate the nuisance and pre-
vent its repetition for a period of one year.
Most of the acts specified in the above statutes were nuisances at
common law. But equity has been hesitant to enjoin nuisances where
the conduct was also a crime. Hence the legislatures have acted to re-
assure equity courts of their jurisdiction and to encourage them with a
more extensive weapon.
The court in the principal case reached its decision under its general
equity powers, and not by statutory provision. It is probable that the
extensive scope of statutory injunctions influenced the court in going
that far.
HARRY LEE RIDDLE, JR.
Fraudulent Conveyances--Dower Where the Conveyance Is Set
Aside-Interests of the Parties.
Plaintiff's husband, eleven months before their marriage, conveyed
real estate to his mother in fraud of his creditors. Whereupon a cred-
itor brought an action to set aside the conveyance, and caused notice
of lis pendens to be filed. Plaintiff thereafter married the debtor, and
subsequently a judgment was rendered setting aside the conveyance as
to the creditor. After her husband's death the plaintiff claims dower
in this land against the defendants, the purchasers (and their vendees),
under a sale pursuant to the judgment in the action to which the wife
was not a party. Held, fraudulent conveyances are valid as between
the parties, and the plaintiff's husband was never beneficially seized
during coverture so that dower would attach.'
It is a generally accepted rule that an absolute conveyance of prop-
erty in fraud of creditors is good as against all the world, except the
" Pompono Horse Club v. State, 93 Fla. 415, 111 So. 801 (1927).
CAL. GEN. LAws ANN. (Deering, 1931) Act 6161, §1; COLO. STAT. ANN.
(Michie, 1935) Vol. 2 c. 1 §1.
" ALA. CoDE ANN. (Michie, 1928) §9280; DEL. REV. CoD. (1935) §5272;D. C. CoDE (1930) tit. 6, §184; N. C. CoDE ANN. (Michie, 1935) §3180.
'McLawhorn v. Smith, 211 N. C. 513, 191 S. E. 35 (1937).
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defrauded creditors.2 The fraudulent grantee has a superior equity as
against the grantor, and, where the conveyance has been impeached by
the creditors, is entitled to any surplus remaining after satisfaction of
the creditors' claims.8 Where the wife has joined in the conveyance so
impeached her right of dower is usually held to revive, irrespective of
her knowledge of her husband's intent.4 Other jurisdictions distinguish
between the wife's knowledge and lack of knowledge of the husband's
intent, and allow her dower to revive only in the latter instance.6 The
revival is based on the theory that since the inchoate dower right can-
not -be sold or released except to one having an interest in the land,0 and
since the grantee has been deprived of his interest for the benefit of the
grantor's creditors, the release must fail.7 Nor can the creditors set up
the release to bar the wife's dower, because the release operates by way
of estoppel and binds the wife only so far as the parties to the release
and their privies are concerned." Dower in the entire quantity of land
is restored to the wife or widow "just as if no such deed had been
'Dent v. Ferguson, 132 U. S. 50, 10 Sup. Ct. 13, 33 L. ed. 242 (1889) ; Back-
house v. Jett, .2 Fed. Cas. No. 710 (C. C. D. Va. 1821); Atwater v. Seeley, 2
Fed. 133 (C. C. D. Minn. 1880) ; The Inhabitants of Canton v. The Inhabitants
of Dorchester, 8 Cush. 525 (Mass. 1851) ; Coltraine v. Causey, 38 N. C. 246
(1844) ; Ellington v. Currie, 40 N. C. 21 (1847) ; York v. Merritt, 80 N. C. 285
(1879) ; Saunders v. Lee, 101 N. C. 3, 7 S. E. 590 (1888) ; Pierce v. Stallings, 163
N. C. 107, 79 S. E. 302 (1913); Marshall v. Dicks, 175 N. C. 38, 94 S. E. 514
(1918) ; Mosely v. Mosely, 15 N. Y. 334 (1857).
a Abbey v. Zimmerman, 12 Cal. App. (2d) 311, 55 P. (2d) 903 (1936) ; Crowin-
shield v. Kittridge, 7 Met. 520 (Mass. 1944); Wheeler v. Wallace, 53 Mich. 364,
19 N. W. 37 (1884) ; Maze v. Griffin,,6 Mo. App, 377 (1896) ; Tetrault v. Ingra-
ham, 54 Mont. 524, 171 Pac. 1148 (1918). Accord: Sturges v. Portis Mining Co.,
206 Fed. 534 (E. D. N. C. 1913); see Charles v. White, 214 Mo. 187, 190, 112
S. W. 545, 548, 21 L. R. A. (N. s.) 481 (1908). But see Ballard v. Jones, 6
Humph. 455, 458 (Tenn. 1846).
"Robinson v. Bates, 3 Metc. 40 (Mass. 1841) ; Summers v. Babb, 13 Ill. 483
(1851); Lowry v. Fisher, 2 Bush 70 (Ky. 1867); Malloney v. Horan, 49 N. Y.
111 (1872) ; In re Lingafelter, 181 Fed. 24 (C. C. A. 6th, 1910) ; Wilson v. Rob-
inson, 83 F. (2d) 397 (C. C. A. 2d, 1936); Cox v. Wilder, 6 Fed. Cas. No. 3308
(C. C. E. D. Mo. 1872); Wyman v. Fox, 59 Me. 100 (1871); Ridgway v. Mast-
ings, 23 Ohio St. 294 (1872); Munger v. Perkins, 62 Wis. 499, 22 N. W. 511
(1885); Jenkins v. Mollenhauer, 105 Misc. 15, 173 N. Y. Supp. 870 (1918); EX
parte Clark, 125 S. C. 34, 118 S. E. 27 (1923) ; Elliott v, Locklear, 185 Ark. 269,
46 S. W. (2d) 1105 (1932). Contra: Den, Ex Dem. Stewart v. Johnson, 18 N. J.
L. 87 (1840); Dey v. Allen, 77 N. J. Eq. 522, 78 AtI. 674 (1910); Barhan v.
Bogard, 128 Ore. 218, 270 Pac. 762 (1928).
Kitts v. Wilson, 130 Ind. 492, 29 N. E. 401 (1891); Wells v. Estes, 154 Mo.
291, 55 S. W. 255 (1900) ; Bradshaw v. Halpin, 180 Mo. 666, 79 S. W. 685 (1904).
1 Lampetes Case, 10 Co. 46 (1613); Saltmarsh v. Smith, 32 Ala. 404 (1858);
Chicago Dock Co. v. Kinzie, 49 Ill. 289 (1868) ; McCormick v. Hunter, 50 Ind.
186 (1875); Harriman v. Gray, 49 Me. 537 (1860); Reiff v. Horst, 55 Md.
47 (1880); Mason v. Mason, 140 Mass. 63; 3 N. E. 19 (1885); TIFFANY, Our-
LINES OF REAL PROPERTY (1929) §163.
"Lockett's adm'x v. James, adm'r, 8 Bush 28 (Ky. 1871); Wyman v. Fox, 59
Me. 100 (1871); Bohannon v. Combs, 97 Mo. 446, 11 S. W. 232 (1889); Munger
v. Perkins, 62 Wis. 499, 22 N. W. 511 (1885).
8Robinson v. Bates, 3 Metc. 40 (Mass. 1841); Lowry v. Fisher, 2 Bush 70
(Ky. 1867) ; Essey v. Bushakra, 299 Mo. 147, 252 S. W. 459 (1923) (creditor with
quitclaim deed from grantee not allowed to prevail over dower).
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executed" or "as if the property had been deeded back to her hus-
band."10
But the above stated general rule declared the grantee to be entitled
against all but creditors. Where there is a surplus after satisfaction
of creditors' claims, the deed is effective to convey that much to him.
As to that portion, would he not have an estate to support the release
of inchoate dower by the wife? But an allotment of dower in the whole
of the premises substantially reduces the amount of the grantee's sur-
plus, or precludes the possibility of there being any surplus. Thus,
under the rules as stated: (1) that the fraudulent grantee is entitled
against all but creditors, and (2) that the wife's dower revives in the
whole property when the transer is set aside, the rights given the widow
and the grantee are conflicting and overlapping. Where his right and
the widow's overlap, she is given preference. It cannot validly be
said, then, that the fraudulent grantee is entitled against all but creditors.
The conveyance is set aside not only as to creditors' claims 'but also to
allow the widow her dower. In effect, the revesting of the estate in the
grantor so that dower may re-attach is made the basis of predication
of dower, rather than the inefficacy of the release of the inchoate
dower. Indeed, such a basis is the only one that is legally tenable.
Under the facts of the principal case, where the conveyance was
made before the marriage, would it not follow that the revesting of the
estate in the grantor to meet creditors' claims would be sufficient to allow
his wife's dower to attach, especially since she personally did not par-
ticipate in the fraud? Only two courts have previously passed directly
on the point, and they held to the contrary."1 They reasoned as does the
court in the principal case-that the grantor is not seized to his own use
during coverture. Nor was he seized to his own use when the estate
was revested in him at the instance of creditors where the conveyance
was made after marriage. Yet, as was pointed out, that revesting was
the only justification for the restoration of dower in all of the property.
Why should it not serve the same purpose here where the wife was not
a party to the fraud?
Still, despite the fact that its reasoning (based on the fallacy in the
stated rules in cases where the conveyance was made after marriage) is
unsound, the principal case reaches the correct result. Here, as is
usually the case, the creditor's claim absorbed all of the proceeds of
the sale of the property, and the creditor has an equity prior to that of
the widow. His priority is 'by reason of his equitable lien attaching
See Ex parte Clark, 125 S. C. 34, 37, 118 S. E. 27, 28 (1923).
Jenkins v. Mollenhauer, 105 Misc. 15, 16, 173 N. Y. Supp. 870, 871 (1918).
"Whited v. Mallory, 4 Cush. 138 (Mass. 1849); Gross v. Lange, 70 Mo. 45
(1879). But see Adkins v. Adkins, 52 S. W. 728, 731 (Tenn. Ch. App. 1899).
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as of the date of the institution of the action' 2 (which was before the
marriage) to set aside the transfer.' 3 Thus the creditor's lien attached
before the dower could attach, and a sale to satisfy the prior lien would
effectually bar any dower claim against the defendant purchasers under
such sale. Because of his priority the creditor is entitled to full satis-
faction of his claim out of the proceeds of the sale before other sub-
sequent rights therein are considered. Where, however, the creditors'
claims do not require all of the proceeds, it would seem that the widow
should be entitled to her dower as against the grantee's claim. We have
seen that logically the revesting of the estate in the grantor should be
sufficient to support dower (whether the wife has ever before had dower
in the property or not), and the fraudulent grantee's deed should be
ineffective against rights of the widow and the creditor arising out of
the revesting of title in the grantor. The equity of the widow as against
the grantee is further strengthened by the fact that though her claim is
through her husband's title which is tainted with fraud, she did not
actually participate in the fraud and is not in pari delicto with the
grantee. C. A. GRIFFIN, JR.
Labor Law-State Anti-Injunction Statutes.
Since the advent of the New Deal there has been a rapidly growing
tendency to look upon labor with an increasingly liberal attitude, evi-
denced, in state labor anti-injunction legislation,' by the correction of
the abuses caused by the injunction in labor disputes during the past
fifty years.2 Twenty-three states have enacted such legislation,3 each
'Hancock v. Wooten, 107 N. C. 9, 12 S. E. 199 (1890); Frank v. Kessler, 30
Ind. 8 (1868) ; Lindley v. Cross, 31 Ind. 106 (1869) ; Wooten v. Steele, 109 Ala.
563 19 So. 972 (1895). Accord: The Dawson Bank v. Harris, 84 N. C. 206 (1881) ;
Armstrong Grocery Co. v. Banks, 185 N. C. 149, 116 S. E. 173 (1923) ; cf. Cas-
sady v. Anderson, 53 Tex. 535 (1880) ; Arbuckle Bros. Coffee Co. v. Werner and
Cohen, 77 Tex. 43, 13 S. W. 963 (1890).
' 'Most jurisdictions require that a judgment be obtained against the grantor
as a condition precedent to the suit to set aside the fraudulent conveyance. Allyn
v. Thurston, 53 N. Y. 622 (1873) ; Estes v. Wilcox, 67 N. Y. 264 (1876) ; Whitney
v. Davis, 148 N. Y. 256, 42 N. E. 661 (1896) ; WAITE, FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES
AND CREDITORS' BILLS (3d ed. 1897) 149.
'No attempt will be made to consider federal anti-injunction legislation.
2 FRANKFURTER AND GREENE, THE LABOR INJUNcTION (1930) ; Fraenkel, Recent
Statutes Affecting Labor Injunctions and Yellow Dog Contracts (1936) 30 ILL. L.
REv. 854.3 ARiz. REv. CODE ANN. (Struckmeyer, 1928) §4286 CAL GEN. LAWS (Deer-
ing, 1931) act 1605; COLO. STAT. ANN. (Michie, 1935) c. 97, §78; Idaho Sess.
Laws 1933, c. 215; ILL. RE V. STAT. ANN. (Cahill, 1933) c. 22, §58; ILL. STAT. ANN.
(Callaghan, Supp. 1925-31) c. 22, §58; IND. STAT. ANN. (Burns, 1933) §40-504;
KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. (Corrick, 1935) c. 60, §1107; LA. GEN. STAT. (Dart, Supp.
1936) §4379.7; ME. LAws 1933, c. 261, §1; MD. CODE ANN. (Bagby, Supp. 1935) c.
574, §67; Mass. Acts 1935, c. 407, §4; MINN. STAT. (Mason, Supp. 1936) §§4260-
4264; MONT. REv. CODE- ANN. (Anderson & MtFarland, 1935) §9242; N. J. CObzt.
STAT. (Supp. 1925-30) §107-131a; N. Y. CimL PRAcrics (Cahill, Supp. 1936)
§876a; N. D. Laws 1935, c. 247; OKLA. STAT. 1931, §10878; ORE. CODE ANN.
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of the statutes having substantially the same provisions.4 Generally,5
they prohibit the courts from enjoining the peaceful activities of labor
in disputes with employers, i.e., striking, holding meetings, publishing
grievances, -peaceful picketing, and using strike funds without restric-
tion.6
The first case involving the validity of an anti-injunction statute to
come before the Supreme Court of the United States7 was that of
Truax v. Corrigans in 1921. The court, in a five to four decision, ruled
the Arizona statute unconstitutional because it violated the due process
and equal protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment.9 The state
courts, relying on this decision, have, until recent years, consistently
declared similar statutes invalid.1 °
A change of attitude, however, became apparent during the depres-
sion years with their attendant labor troubles. The Oregon Supreme
Court led the way in 1932 when it pronounced such a statute to be
valid 1 if properly construed. 12 All of the reported cases since 1933,
with the exception of one,' 3 have upheld the validity of anti-injunction
(1930) §§49-902, 49-903; PA. STAT. (Purden, 1936) §43-203; UTAH REV. STAT.
ANN. (1933) §§4-2-6, 4-2-7; WAsH. REV. STAT. ANN. (Remington, 1932) §§1712-
1714; Wis. STAT. 1935, §§103:53, 103:63; Wyo. Sess. Laws 1937, c. 15, §1.
"For a classification and comparison of these statutes, see Riddlesbarger,
State Anti-Injunction Legislation (1935) 14 ORE. L. REv. 501.
'Most of the statutes have additional provisions prohibiting "yellow dog" con-
tracts, ex parte injunctions and the restraint of acts other than those specifically
complained of, and guaranteeing the right to a jury trial to all persons charged
with violating labor injunctions.
Fraenkel, supra note 2, at 871.
'California and Massachusetts anti-injunctitn statutes had been previously
declared unconstitutional by state tribunals, the courts employing substantially the
same reasoning as that applied in. Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U. S. 312, 42 Sup. Ct.
124, 66 L. ed. 254, 27 A. L. R. 375 (1921) ; Goldberg, Bowen and Co. v. Stablemen's
Union, 149 Cal. 429, 86 Pa< 806, 8 L. R. A. (N. s.) 460 (1906) ; Pierce v. Stable-
men's Union, 156 Cal. 70, 103 Pac. 324 (1909) ; Bogni v. Perotti, 224 Mass. 252,
112 N. E. 853, L. R. A. 1916F 831 (1916).
6257 U. S. 312, 42 Sup. Ct. 124, 66 L. ed. 254, 27 A. L. R. 375 (1921).9Pitney (with whom Clarke, J., concurred), Brandeis, and Holmes, JJ., each
wrote a dissenting opinion maintaining that the statute was a valid exercise of
the police powers of the legislature and that the classification was not so unreason-
able as to violate the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
"In -re Opinion of the Justices, 275 Mass. 580, 176 N. E. 649 (1931), Note
(1932) 17 CORN. L. Q. 666; In re Opinion of the Justices, 86 N. H. 597, 166 Atl.
640 (1933), Note (1934) 18 MiNN. L. Rzv. 184; Greenfield v. Central Labor
Council, 104 Ore. 236, 192 Pac. 783 (1922); see Bull v. International Alliance,
119 Kan. 713, 718, 241 Pac. 459, 461 (1925); Elkind and Sons, et al. v. Retail
Clerks' Protective Ass'n, 114 N. J. Eq. 586, 595, 169 AtI. 494, 497 (1933) ; Pacific
Coast Coal Co. v. Dist. No. 10, U. M. W. A., 122 Wash. 423, 436, 210 Pac. 953,
957 (1922).
a' Moreland Theaters Corp. v. Portland M. P. M. 0. P. Union, 140 Ore. 35, 12
P. (2d) 333 (1932).
'The validity of these statutes has, from the outset, depended largely upon
whether the courts construed them as legalizing unlawful acts. Many courts look
upon picketing as being unlawful in itself and therefore ruled that the statute
attempted to make an unlawful act legal.
1 Blanchard v. Golden Age Brewing Co., 188 Wash. 396, 63 P. (2d) 397 (1936).
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legislation. These recent decisions have, for the most part, followed the
same line of reasoning: that due process is not violated, for the legis-
lature may, in the exercise of its police powers, make such regulations
as the welfare of the public requires, even to the extent of interfering
with the liberty and property of an individual; that equal protection is
not taken away, for the classification is a reasonable one,' 4 since labor
injunction cases are fundamentally different from ordinary equitable
actions ;15 and that the inherent equity powers of the courts are not
abridged, for the statute, while it limits the jurisdiction of the courts in
prohibiting the issuance of injunctions in certain cases, does not deprive
the courts of the power to restrain unlawful acts.16 The climax in this
change in the attitude of the courts came recently when the United
States Supreme Court declared a Wisconsin anti-injunction statute to
be constitutional, in the first case to reach it since Truax v. Corrigan,
involving the validity of this type of legislation. 17 The court distin-
guishes this case from Truax v. Corrigan on the grounds that in the
latter the Arizona court construed the statute as legalizing picketing,
which at that time was considered to 'be unlawful in any form,' 8 while
in the instant case the Wisconsin court construed the statute as prohibit-
ing the issuance of injunctions only against peaceful picketing, which
is now regarded as being lawful.19 From recent decisions, then, it
appears that: "More and more the tendency is to permit the parties to
The case was decided, in the face of a strong dissent, on the grounds that the
statute violated that section of the state constitution which specifically granted to
the courts the power to issue injunctions. For comments on this case see (1937)
23 VA. L. Rm. 606 and (1937) 4 U. OF CHI. L. REv. 500.
' The courts have uniformly held that the constitutional guarantee of equal
protection of the laws to all citizens is not violated by legislation affecting only a
certain group of citizens, as long as the classification is reasonable and there is
no discrimination against members of the group. Labor anti-injunction statutes
apply only to the employee-employer group.
'When an injunction is issued, the striker is immediately branded as a law-
breaker in the eyes of the public. And since strikes are usually short, the issuance
of even a temporary injunction nearly always decides the case immediately. Note
(1934) 18 MINN. L. Rav. 184 at 191.
"Aberdeen Restaurant Corp. v. Gottfried, 158 Misc. 758, 285 N. Y. Supp. 832
(1935) ; Dehan v. Hotel and Restaurant Employees and Beverage Dispensers, 159
So. 637 (La. 1935) ; American Furniture Co. v. T. B. of T. C. and H. of A., 222
Wis. 338, 268 N. W. 250, 106 A. L. R. 335 (1936); Starr v. Laundry and Dry
Cleaning Workers' Local Union No. 101, 63 P. (2d) 1104 (Ore. 1936), (1937)
16 ORE. L. Rzv. 192; Fenske Bros. Inc. v. Upholsterers' International Union, 358
Ill. 239, 193 N.. E. 112, 97 A. L. R. 1318 (1934), Notes (1935) 30 ILL. L. REV.
237, (1935) 13 CrI-KENT REV. 170, (1935) 35 COL. L. REv. 616; Geo. B. Wallace
Co. v. International Ass'n of Mechanics, 63 P. (2d) 1090 (Ore. 1936) ; see Bayonne
Textile Corp. v. American Fed. of Silk Workers, 116 N. J. Eq. 146, 164, 172 At.
551, 559, 92 A. L. R. 1450, 1463 (1934).
" Senn v. Tile Layers Protection Union, 57 Sup, Ct. 857, 81 L. ed. Adv. Ops.
829 (1937).
" FRANKFURTER AND GREENE, op. cit. s£1pra note 2, at 171.
" It is interesting to note that Mr. Justice Brandeis, who dissented strongly
in Truax v. Corrigan, wrote the majority opinion in the instant case.
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settle their differences without resort to injunction. The old order was
injunction first, the new is injunction last."20
North Carolina has been extremely fortunate in escaping the labor
injunction abuses which have been so prevalent in other jurisdictions.21
The state was untroubled -by labor injunction cases until as late as 1921,
when, in the case of McGinnis v. Raleigh Typographical Union,22 an
injunction was granted which specifically listed the acts28 and the parties
restrained. Three years later, in Citizen v. Asheville Typographical
Union,24 the court became more conservative and affirmed a restraining
order which not only enjoined all picketing, but also contained an all-
inclusive and ambiguous. clause restraining the defendants and all other
persons from "doing any acts or things whatsoever in furtherance of
any conspiracy of combination among themselves or any of them to
obstruct and interfere with the plaintiff or its business .... ,25 In the
third and last North Carolina decision, the unreported case of Marion
Manufacturing Co. v. United Textile Workers,2 6 the injunction was
ambiguous in its terms, and hence, although the court did require that
notice be- personally served on each defendant, there was much con-
fusion as to exactly what acts were enjoined. Thus, while the North
Carolina court in the first case was extremely liberal towards labor, the
injunctions granted in the last two cases are characterized by the vague
sweeping terms which have been the despair of organized labor in other
states ever since "government by injunction" began.28 Both liberalism
and conservatism have ,been exhibited in these three cases, and it is im-
possible to foretell which attitude the North Carolina court will adopt
in the future.
While it is true that the number of labor injunction cases in North
Carolina has been strikingly small in the past, it is inevitable, in view
of the fact that the state is in a- process of rapid industrial growth, that
labor disputes will increase and the injunction tend to become common.
And, since the trend of the courts throughout the nation is to uphold
' Collins, J., in Goldfinger v. Feintuch, 159 Misc. 806, 288 N. Y. Supp. 855,
863 (1936).
" McCRACKEN, STRIKE INJuNcTIONs IN THE NaW SOUTH (1931).
182 N. C. 770, 108 S. E. 728 (1921).
' Mass picketing, intimidation of employees, following employees, abusive
epithets, and attempting to persuade employees to break employment contracts.
S187 N. C. 42, 121 S. E. 31 (1924). 1 Id. at 44, 121 S. E. at 32.
SMCCRACKEN, op. cit. supra note 21, at 79. (Superior Court, McDowell
County, July 24, 1929).
w Id. at 84.
'The labor injunction has become an object of hatred for many reasons, but
probably the chief among these is that the courts have, in most cases, issued
restraining orders enjoining almost everybody from doing anything whatsoever
in furtherance of labor's attempts to improve its situation. Due to vagueness and
uncertainty of terms, and the failure to require personal notice to be served on
the defendants, it is often impossible to determine just which acts and parties are
restrained.
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anti-injunction legislation, North Carolina might probably avoid the
abuses which the use of the injunction has thrust upon labor in other
jurisdictions by passing the Model Anti-injunction Act.29
JAmES D. CA.R.
Municipal CorpoTations-Remedies Allowed Holders of
Invalid Bonds-Constructive Trusts.
Municipal bonds, issued for the erection of a school building, were
invalid because the city had no constitutional power to devote funds to
such purposes. The United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit held that the plaintiff, holder of the entire bond issue, was
entitled to have the municipality made a constructive trustee of the
school building. This had been built on a city lot with funds supplied
from the bond issue and by the county board of public instruction. The
court decreed that the way was to be left open to the interested parties
(the city, county board, and bondholder) "for such adjustments, whether
by sale or rental, as may be within their several powers." 1 In a previous
action for money had and received the plaintiff had failed because of
the Statute of Limitations. 2 In the instant case there is a clear dictum
that such an action would not lie on the merits, for the city no longer
had the money, nor had it been used for a proper municipal purpose.8
It is settled that no action may be maintained on an invalid municipal
bond. 4 However, where the city had the power both to borrow money
and to devote it to the purposes for which the bonds were issued, the
invalidity being due to mere irregularities in form or manner of issu-
ance, 5 the bondholder may recover for money had and received. 0 The
'Prepared by Nathaniel Greene and Felix Frankfurter, and published by the
National Committee on Labor Injunctions of the American Civil Liberties League,
100 Fifth Ave., New York City.
'Nuveen v. Board of Public Instruction, 88 F. (2d) 175 (C. C. A. 5th, 1937),
cert. denied 57 Sup. Ct. 794. The adjustment would probably be a pro rata share.
But see NuVeen v. Quincy, 115 Fla. 510, 524, 156 So. 153, 159 (1934) (in a dictum
the state court on the same facts said that a constructive trust should be refused).
'State ex tel. Nuveen v. Greer, 88 Fla. 249, 102 So. 739 (1924).
' See Nuveen v. Board of Public Instruction, 88 F. (2d) 175, 178 (1937).
"Dodge v. Memphis, 51 Fed. 165 (C. C. E. D. Mo. 1892) ;1 German Ins. Co. v.
Manning, 95 Fed. 597 (C. C. S. D. Iowa 1899); Swanson v. Ottumwa, 131 Iowa
540, 106 N. W. 9 (1906); People's Bank of St. Paul v. School Dist. 3 N. D. 496,
57 N. W. 787 (1893).
r Louisiana v. Wood, 102 U. S. 294, 26 L. ed. 153 (1880) (not registering bonds
with proper authorities) ; Gause v. Clarksville, 1 Fed. 353 (C. C. E. D. Mo. 1880)
(voters in bond election were not sworn properly) ; Geer v. School Dist. No. 11
in Ouray County, 111 Fed. 682 (C. C. A. 8th, 1901), and Fernald v. Gilman, 123
Fed. 797 (C. C. S. D. Iowa: 1903) (municipality, although authorized to become
indebted, was not entitled to secure the money by bonds) ; State ex rel. North-
western Nat. Bank v. Dickerman, 16 Mont. 278, 40 Pac. 698 (1895) (non-com-
pliance with notice requirement) ; Hoag v. Greenwich, 133 N. Y. 152, 30 N. E.
842 (1892) (bonds came due at different dates than allowed by law) ; Rainsburg
v. Fyan, 127 Pa. 74, 17 Atl. 678 (1889) (not filing statement as required).0 Hitchcock v. Galveston, 96 U. S. 341, 24 L. ed. 659 (1877); Louisiana v.
Wood, 102 U. S. 294, 26 L. ed. 153 (1880) ; Read v. Plattsmouth, 107 U. S. 568,
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recovery is quasi-contractual on the theory that the municipality has re-
ceived a benefit from the bond money which it would be inequitable to
retain without compensation.7 Where the funds have not been used
for the benefit of the city, recovery is denied.8
On the other hand, where the city was totally without power to
incur indebtedness at the time,9 or for the purpose'O for which the
bonds were issued, recovery for money had and received is denied.11
The reasons advanced for refusal to grant this relief are either based on
the administrative policy that all persons dealing with a municipality
must be presumed to know the limits of its power, and therefore act
at their peril,' 2 or on the theory that a refusal to find an implied promise
to pay makes more effective a direct constitutional prohibition of such
indebtedness.' 3 Regardless of the varying language of the courts, the
motive for refusing relief is the protection of the taxpayer.' 4 Other-
2 Sup. Ct. 208, 27 L. ed. 414 (1882) (although generally cited for this proposition,
the case allows recovery where the debt incurred was in excess of limitation) ;
Gause v. Clarksville, 1 Fed. 353 (C. C. E. D. Mo. 1880); Bangor Savings Bank v.
Stillwater, 45 Fed. 544 (C. C. D. Minn. 1891); Geer v. School Dist. No. 11 in
Ouray County, 111 Fed. 682 (C. C. A. 8th, 1901); Fernald v. Gilman, 123 Fed.
797 (C. C. S. D. Iowa 1903); Chelsea Savings Bank v. Ironwood, 130 Fed. 410
(C. C. A. 6th, 1904) ; Gilman v. Fernald, 141 Fed. 941 (C. C. A. 8th, 1905) ; Board
of Commissioners of Bayou Terre Aux Boeufs Drainage Dist. v. McClellan et aL,
164 La. 808, 114 So. 694 (1927) ; State ex rel. Northwestern Nat. Bank v. Dicker-
man, 16 Mont. 278, 40 Pac. 698 (1895); Hoag v. Greenwich, 133 N. Y. 152,
30 N. E. 842 (1892); Rainsburg v. Fyan, 127 Pa. 24, 17 Atl. 678 (1889);
Paul v. Kenosha, 22 Wis. 266 (1867); cf. Thompson v. Elton, 109 Wis. 589,
85 N. W. 425 (1901). There is authority that unless there is privity between
bondholder and municipality there can be no recovery. Lumbermen's Trust
Co. v. Ryegate, 61 F. (2d) 14 (C. C. A. 9th, 1932); Henderson v. Nat. Bank
of Evansville, Ind., 185 Ky. 693, 215 S. W. 527 (1919); see Coquard v. Oquawka,
192 Ill. 355, 368, 61 N. E. 660, 664 (1901). Contra: Geer v. School Dist. No.
11 in Ouray County, 111 Fed. 682 (C. C. A. 8th, 1901); Fernald v. Gilman, 123
Fed. 797 (C. C. S. D. Iowa 1903) ; Chelsea Saw. Bank v. Ironwood, 130 Fed. 410
(C. C. A. 6th, 1904).
e WOODWARD, THE LAW OF QUAsI-CoNTRACTS (1913) §9.
"Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Middleport, 124 U. S. 534, 8 Sup. Ct. 625, 31 L. ed.
537 (1887) ; Hedges v. Dixon County, 150 U. S. 182, 14 Sup. Ct. 71, 37 L. ed. 1044
(1893) ; Travelers' Ins. Co. v. Mayor, etc. of Johnson City, 99 Fed. 663 (C. C. A.
6th, 1900) ; Swanson v. Ottumwa, 131 Iowa 540, 106 N. W. 9 (1906) ; Waitz v.
Ormsby County, 1 Nev. 370 (1865) ; Bolton v. Wharton, 163 S. C. 242, 161 S. E.
454 (1931).
9Litchfield v. Ballou, 114 U. S. 190, 5 Sup. Ct. 820, 29 L. ed. 132 (1885);
Heyburn v. Security Say. & Trust Co., 55 Idaho 732, 49 P. (2d) 258 (1935);
McPherson v. Foster Bros., 43 Iowa 48 (1876) ; Balch v. Beach, 118 Wis. 267, 95
N. W. 132 (1903).
" Davis v. Stokes County, 74 N. C. 374 (1876). Contra: Henderson v. Red-
man, 185 Ky. 146, 214 S. W. 809 (1919); Henderson v. Winstead, 185 Ky. 693,
215 S. W. 527 (1919) ; see Field, Governtent Bonds and Private Promises Under
Unconstitutional Statutes (1931) 17 IowA L. REv. 1, 11.
u Morton v. Nevada, 41 Fed. 582 (C. C. W. D. Mo. 1890); McGurdy v.
Shiawasse County, 154 Mich. 550, 118 N. W. 625 (1908); 2 DILLON, MUNICI'AL
CORPORATONS (5th ed. 1911) §961; 6 McQu_.LIN, MUNICIP.A CORPORATIONS (2d
ed. 1928) §2509; WOODWARD, THE LAW OF QUASI-CONTRACTS (1913) §161.
" Balch v. Beach, 118 Wis. 267, 95 N. W. 132 (1903).
UMorton v. Nevada, 41 Fed. 582 (C. C. W. D. Mo. 1890).
14McAlvay, J., in McGurdy v. Shiawasse County, 154 Mich. 550, 561, 118 N. W.
625, 629 (1908) says: "he (the taxpayer) is the public for whose benefit the
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wise, innocent taxpayers would suffer for the corrupt or unwise acts of
their officials in incurring unauthorized debts.' 5
The principal case is one of a very few in which a constructive trust
has been decreed as a remedy for the holder of invalid municipal bonds.' 6
The idea was suggested as long ago as 1885 in Litchfield v. Ballou.'7
There, however, the action was brought on the theory of money had
and received, and in a dictum the court denied plaintiff's right to a
constructive trust because of the difficulty of tracing the funds,18 and
because "equity will r4o more raise a trust in favor of the bondholder
than the law will raise an implied assumpsit against a public policy so
strongly declared." In a Kentucky case' 9 this relief was granted, but
under the law of Kentucky2 0 it would seem that the bondholder could
have recovered for money had and received. A recent New Mexico
decision 21 allowed the holders of invalid certificates of indebtedness to
have school buildings, erected largely with funds from the certificates,
held in trust for them to the extent of their proportionate shares. These
certificates were invalid because the statute authorizing the board to
borrow money was unconstitutional. The court stressed the fact that
the certificates were merely irregular. This is doubtful. As the statute
was unconstitutional, was not the board totally without power to bor-
row money for building a school? If the reasoning of the court is ac-
cepted, however, there could have been a recovery for money had and
received.2 2 Thus, the principal case is the first square holding in which
a constructive trust was used to give a bondholder succor otherwise
denied him.
Is it desirable to decree a constructive trust as a remedy for the
.municipality exists, and which bears all the burdens tput upon it, but which is not
consulted when such burdens, as in this case (borrowing money without authority),
are assumed."
'However, see the argument advanced in 21 NAT. MuNIc. REv. 246 that every
time recovery is denied because of the invalidity of a municipal bond the credit
of the city is seriously embarrassed which works to the detriment of the taxpayer.
I Others are: Fordsville v. Postel, 121 Ky. 67, 88 S. W. 1065 (1907) ; Shaw v.
Board of Education, 38 N. M. 298, 31 P. (2d) 993 (1934).
'¢114 U. S. 190, 194, 5 Sup. Ct. 820, 822, 29 L. ed. 132, 134 (1885).
Ths objection does not seem sound. The tracing problem in these cases is
relatively simple, since even under the strict rule applied in a majority of juris-
dictions, if the property can be traced step by step it does not matter' if changes
in form have occurred. The question is merely mathematical-the percentage of
the bond money to the original value of the property involved. 4 BOGERT, TRusTs
AND TRuSTEES (1935) §921; Scott, The Right to Follow Money Wronguli
Mingled With Other Money (1913) 27 HARV. L. Rzv. 125.
"Fordsville v. Postel, 121 Ky. 67, 88 S. W. 1065 (1907).
"Henderson v. Redman, 185 Ky. 146, 214 S. W. 809 (1919); Henderson v.
Winstead, 185, Ky. 693, 215 S. W. 527 (1919); see Field, supra note 11 at p. 13,
where it is maintained that the holder of invalid bonds may recover against the
city for money had and received even when the city had no power to borrow or
to use money for the purposes to which the bond funds were devoted, so long as
the city receives a benefit and there is privity between municipality and bondholder.
n Shaw v. Board of Education, 38 N. M. 298, 31 P. (2d) 993 (1934).
21 See cases cited .upra note 6.
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holder of invalid municipal bonds? To do so might deprive the citizens
of the use of the school, utility, or other service made possible by bond
funds. Similar fears underlie the statutory refusals to allow mechanics'
liens on public buildings.23 Frequently, the res is constructed partially
from bond proceeds and partially from tax money. In this situation,
the contributing taxpayers' interests are jeopardized,24 as full value
would seldom be obtained under the forced sale or lease necessary to
adjust the rights of the interested parties. If the value of the res has
increased, the bondholder-beneficiary of the constructive trust might
actually receive a return greater than the amount of the debt.25 If
bond funds had been mingled with other monies all parties might share
pro rata.2 6 A constructive trust is thought of as a remedy where
there has been fraud, misrepresentation, duress, or something more than
mere breach of contract. None of these is present in the case under
consideration. The bondholder was not obligated to buy the securities
and may be said to have walked in with his eyes wide open to the usual
risks. If the denial of money had and received is necessary to effectuate
the constitutional prohibition, is not the refusal of a constructive trust
equally required?
On the other hand, to deny a constructive trust where money had
and received will not lie is to give the community a benefit for which
it has not paid and legally cannot pay. Thus, the city is unjustly en-
riched at the expense of the bondholder.
If the money derived from the bonds is still intact in the city treas-
ury there should be no objection to a constructive trust. The bondholder
is only regaining that which he supplied and no inconvenience or loss
is suffered by citizens or taxpayers of the municipality. In any other
situation, however, the courts, for the reasons suggested, should be very
hesitant to decree this relief. The principal case appears to have been
unwisely decided. ROBERT C. HowisoN, JR.
I N. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1935) §2445 requires contractors of public build-
ings to give bond to help cover materialmen's and laborers' claims. This is be-
cause North Carolina has no statute providing for mechanics' liens on public build-
ings. Snow and Ellington, Royster & Co. v. Board of Commissioners of Durham
County, 112 N. C. 336, 17 S. E. 176 (1893) ; Morganton Hardware Co. v. Morgan-
ton Graded Schools, 151 N. C. 507, 66 S. E. 583 (1909).
When possible the bondholder would seek relief in an action for money had
and received if the property -had decreased in value, for that remedy would enable
him to regain all that he had expended. But in the numerous cases where money
bad and received would not lie the constructive trust would certainly cause tax-
payer loss.
. See Scott, supra note 18 at 128; 4 BOGERT, TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES (1935)
§921 at p. 2653.
By analogy to cases in 'which a trustee has wrongfully mingled trust money
with his own for purchasing life insurance, where the cestui, by the weight of
authority, is entitled to a pro rata share of the money derived from the policy.
See Scott, supra note 18 at 128. There are cases, however, allowing the cestui
to receive only insurance proceeds equivalent to the trust money with interest. 4
BOGERT, TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES (1935) §924.
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Public Utilities--Rural Electrification Co-operatives-
Certificate of Convenience and Necessity.
The Johnston County Electric Membership Corporation was formed
under the 1935 statute' providing for the organization of co-operative
electric utilities. The Carolina Power & Light Co. sought to enjoin the
co-operative from constructing power lines in Johnston County par-
alleling its own lines, on the ground that defendant had not secured a
certificate of convenience and necessity from the utilities commissioner,
as required 2 of public utilities. Held: The 1935 statute expressly pro-
vides that corporations formed thereunder are not subject to the pro-
visions of any other act; hence defendant needs no certificate. 8
In furtherance of the national power policy, federal agencies in the
past three years have successfully encouraged a number of state legis-
latures to pass more or less uniform laws designed to promote rural
electrification. The North Carolina statutes are fairly typical. They
provide (1) for the establishment of a state Rural Electrification
Authority, and (2) for the organization of co-operative electric mem-
bership corporations. 4 On the application of five persons who wish to
form a co-operative, the Authority has a survey made, and if it thinks
the proposal feasible, grants the requested privilege. The Authority
also has the power of eminent domain; and co-operatives desiring loans
or grants from the federal Rural Electrification Administration must
apply through the state Authority.
Nineteen other states5 have statutes dealing with rural electrification.
IN. C. CoDn ANN. (Michie, 1935) §1694(7)-(28).
2 N. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1935) §1037(d).
'Carolina Power & Light Co. v. Johnston County Electric Membership Corp.,
211 N. C. 717, 192 S. E. 105 (1937). After this decision, an agreement was
reached between the plaintiff and the board of directors of defendant, whereby
plaintiff promised to build 325 miles of Vower lines in Johnston County and to pay
all expenditures "made for administrative and other expenses" of the co-operative,
not to exceed $15,000, and defendant was to give up its right to construct lines in
Johnston County. However, three residents of Johnston County brought suit to
enjoin the Carolina Power & Light Co. and the board of directors of the co-
operative from carrying out this agreement, alleging that the act of the board of
directors was idt-ra vires. This injunction -was denied in the Johnston Superior
Court, Grady, J., holdihig that although the action of the board of directors "in
selling out, lock, stock and barrel" to the Carolina Power & Light Co. was a
plain breach of faith, nevertheless plaintiffs have not been injured because they
are getting what they want-electric energy in the rural districts. Plaintiffs have
appealed to the Supreme Court. Bailey v. Carolina Power & Light Co., argued
before N. C. Sup. Ct., Nov. 2, 1937.
'N. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1935) §1694(l)-(28). The statute establishing
the state Authority is N. C. Pub. Laws 1935, c. 288 (N. C. CoDE ANN. (Michie,
1935) §1694(1)-(6)), and that referring to co-operatives is N. C. Pub, Laws
1935, c. 291 (N. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1935) §1694(7)-(28)).
"Ala. Laws 1935, nos. 45, 47 (as amended by no. 303); Ga. Laws 1937, no.
503; Ind. Acts 1935, c. 175; Iowa Laws 1935, c. 390-G1; Ky. STAT. ANN. (Baldwin,
1937) c. 32 art! XVII; Me. Laws 1931, c. 230; Miss. Laws 1936, c. 183, 184;
Mont. Laws 1935, c. 98; Nev. Stat. 1935, c. 72; N. H. Laws 1935, c. 135; N. M.
Laws 1937, c. 100; N. D. Laws 1937, c. 115; ORE. CODE ANN. (Bobbs-Merrill,
1935) §56(3401)-(3460) ; S. C. Acts 1935, no. 65, Acts 1933, no. 275, Acts 1934, no.
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Most of these acts were passed since 1934 and show marked similarities
to the North Carolina statutes. 6 In six of these states7 the Authorities,
rather than the state public service or utilities commissions, have com-
plete control and supervision of the co-operatives, including the power
to set rates.8 In North Carolina the statute establishing the state
Authority provides that the "function of making rates and service
charges and orders for the extension of lines shall remain in the utilities
commission." 9
However, the North Carolina utilities commission cannot require the
co-operative to get a certificate of convenience and necessity. So ruled
the court in the principal case,' 0 basing its decision on Section 1694(28)
which reads: "This article is complete in itself and shall be controlling.
The provisions of any other law, general, special, or local, except as
provided in this article, shall not apply to a corporation formed under
this article."' ' This identical provision appears in the statutes adopted
in ten other states.' 2 But in the remaining nine states' 8 having rural
electrification statutes, this clause is conspicuously absent.' 4
887; S. D. Laws 1935, c. 162; Tenn. Acts 1935, c. 3, 4; Tex. Laws 1937 (Vernon's
Tex. Sess. Law Service, p. 123) ; Vt. Acts 1935, no. 157; VA. CODE ANN. (Michie,
1936) c. 159A.
'Ala., Miss., Tenn. and Vt., like N. C., provide for the establishment of both
Authorities and co-operatives. In Mont., N. H. and S. C., Authorities only are
established, with no provision for co-operatives; exactly the reverse is true in
Ga., Ind., Ky., Me., N. M., N. D., Tex., and Va. Rural electrification statutes
of a somewhat different nature are found in Iowa, Nev., Ore., and S. D.7 Ala., Miss., Mont., N. M., S. C. and Tenn.
' It is worthy of note that none of the five states adopting rural electrification
statutes in 1937 provides for state Authorities, indicating the growing tendency
of the federal Authority to assume control of the co-operatives.9 N. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1935) §1694(3). But quaere as to whether this
provision is not nullified by Section 1694(19) (k), which gives the co-operatives
-power "to fix, maintain and collect fees, rents, tolls and other charges for service
rendered." Section 1694(28), providing that the article is complete in itself, seems
technically to refer only to Sections 1694(7)-(27), relating to co-operatives, and
not to Sections 1694(1)-(6), relating to the state Authority. See supra note 4.
"'Accord: Lexington Mill & Elevator Co. v. Browne, 116 Neb. 753, 219 N. W.
12 (1928).
IN. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1935) §1694(28).
G a., Miss., Mont, Nev., N. M., N. D., S. C., S. D., Tenn. and Tex.
Ala., Ind., Iowa, Ky., Me., N. H., Ore., Vt. and Va. However, Iowa pro-
vides that "Any law conflicting with any part of this chapter shall be construed
as not applicable to associations formed hereunder" (Iowa Laws 1935, §8512-g56) ;
and Vermont provides that the Board of Rural Electrification "shall have ex-
clusive jurisdiction of all corporations organized under the provisions of this
act" (Vt. Acts 1935, no. 157(4)).
ut Kentucky, e.g., stipulates that the provisions of general corporation laws are
applicable to electric co-operatives and that they are subject to the general super-
vision of the public service commission. Ky. STAT. ANN. (Baldwin, 1937) c. 32,
art. XVII, §883j-25, §883j-27(b). Indiana specifically provides that a certificate
must be secured from the public service commission by the co-operative. Ind. Acts
1935, c. 175, §5. Nevada and South Dakota have the same "complete in itself"
clause as North Carolina, but add the provision that before the creation of a
"power district," the public service commission must investigate and find (a)
that the public convenience and necessity require the creation of a -power district,
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The plaintiff attacked this clause as unconstitutional in that it dis-
criminated unfairly between two public utilities. To determine its con-
stifutionality, it is necessary first to inquire whether this co-operative is
a public utility. Until recent years, the vast majority of courts's held
that the offering of service by a co-operative to its members did not
constitute public service within the meaning of commission legislation,
since it purported to serve its members only and not the public at large.'
0
But the courts in some late cases,1 7 looking to substance rather than
form, have reasoned that the co-operative is in reality serving the pub-
lic since any member of the public can join.18 A contrary holding
would provide opportunity for a public utility to avoid commission
regulation: it could set up a co-operative, get each customer to take out
a membership for a nominal fee, and escape regulation on the theory
that it was not holding itself out to the public but was serving only its
own members.
But even if the better view is that co-operatives are public utilities,
it does not necessarily follow that the statutes under consideration re-
sult in unfair discrimination.' 9 The inequality forbidden by the Con-
and (b) that the creation of a power district is economically sound and desirable.
Nev. Stat. 1935, c. 72, §4; S. D. Laws 1935, c. 162, §4.
' Southern Cal. Edison Co. v. Railroad Comm., 194 Cal. 757, 230 Pac. 661(1925); People v. Orange County Farmers' & Merchants' Ass'n, 56 Cal. App.
205, 204 Pac. 873 (1922); Staie Public Utilities Comm. v. Okaw Valley Mut.
Tel. Ass'n, 282 Ill. 336, 118 N. E. 760 (1918); State Public Utilities Comm. v.
Bethany Mut. Tel. Ass'n, 270 Ill. 183, 110 N. E. 334 (1915); Hinds County Water
Co. v. Scanlon, 159 Miss. 757, 132 So. 567 (1931); State ex rel. L. & F. Mut. Tel.
Co. v. Brown, 323 Mo. 818, 19 S. W. (2d) 1048 (1929) ; State v. Southern Elk-
horn Tel. Co., 106 Neb. 342, 183 N. W. 562 (1921); Schumacher v. Railroad
Comm.. 185 Wis. 303, 201 N. W. 241 (1924).
' The distinction was brought out definitely in a Kansas case, State ex rel.
Helm v. Trego County Co-operative Tel. Co., 112 Kan. 701, 212 Pac. 902 (1923),
where the co-operative originally served only members, ,but later also served the
public. The court said that originally the co-operative was not subject to com-
mission jurisdiction, but held that fwhen it began to offer service to the public it
became subject to commission jurisdiction. Accord: State Public Utilities Comm.
v. Noble, 275 Ill. 121, 113 N. E. 910 (1916); Gilman v. Somerset Farmers' Co-
operative Tel. Co., 129 Me. 243, 151 AtI. 440 (1930) ; Commonwealth Tel. Co.
v. Carley, 192 Wis. 464, 213 N. W. 469 (1927). For an interesting discussion of
the question of co-operatives as public utilities, see Packel, Commission Juris-
diction over Utility Co-operatives (1937) 35 MIcH. L. REV. 411.
' Davis v. People ex rel. Public Utilities Comm., 79 Colo. 642, 247 Pac. 801
(1926); Parlett Co-operative v. Tidewater Lines, 164 Md. 405, 165 Atl. 313
(1933); North Shore F. & F. Co. v. North Shore Business Men's Trucking
Ass'n, 195 Minn. 336, 263 N. W. 98 (1935); cf. State ex rel. Bd. of R. R.
Comm'rs v. Rosenstein, 217 Iowa 985, 252 N. W. 251 (1934).
',If it sees fit, it can and will serve the whole public willing to buy a share
of stock ... Its incidents, its powers, and its operations are not to be distinguished
from those of a public carrier, and in truth and in fact it is a public carrier."
Parlett Co-operative v. Tidewater Lines, 164 Md. 405, 418, 165 AtI. 313, 318
(1933).
'(In Parlett Co-operative v. Tidewater Lines, 164 Md. 405, 421, 165 At. 313,
319 (1933), it was said that the exemption of co-operative associations, trans-
porting their members' freight for hire, from statutory provisions applicable to all
public highway carriers for gain, would be uniconstitutional as an arbitrary and
unreasonable classification; but this was mere dictum.
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stitution is only such as is actually and palpably unreasonable and
arbitrary. 20  In Frost v. Corporation Commission,2 1 an amendment to a
statute exempting co-operative ginning associations from the necessity
of obtaining certificates was held void on the ground that the classifica-
tion wag based on no real difference having a reasonable relation to the
object of the legislation. But Justice Sutherland, speaking for the
majority, emphasized that this co-operative was "in no sense a mutual
association" but was engaged in serving "the general public for the
sole purpose of making money," and stated that if this had been a non-
profit co-operative restricted to the business of its own members there
would be no reason to doubt that the classification was valid.2 2 In view
of the wide discretion which the legislature is allowed in the exercise
of its power to make classifications, 23 it is likely that the United States
Supreme Court would hold that there was sufficient difference between
a co-operative and a private utility to justify the distinction created by
the North Carolina statutes.24
But whether constitutional or not, the inclusion in the statutes of
the "complete in itself" provision was ill-advised. Just how much of
the vast field of legislation is covered within the bounds of this in-
definite statement? If it were literally construed, for example, no
action could be brought against a co-operative under any statute pro-
viding a remedy against a corporation in a tort action. Certainly for
clarity's sake, if for no other, this statute needs re-wording. Even
more serious consequences result from the dual control set-up--Rural
Electrification Authority over co-operatives, and utilities commissioner
over other public utilities.2 5 One specific danger encouraged by this
I See Arkansas Gas Co. v. Railroad Comm., 261 U. S. 379, 384, 43 Sup. Ct.
387, 389, 67 L. ed. 705, 710 (1923), and cases cited.
1278 U. S. 515, 49 Sup. Ct. 235, 73 L. ed. 483 (1928).
=278 U. S. 515, 523, 49 Sup. Ct. 235, 238, 73 L. ed. 483, 489 (1928).
Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U. S. 61, 31 Sup. Ct. 337, 55 L.
ed. 369, ANN. CAs. 1912C 165 (1911).2 See German Alliance Ins. Co. v. Lewis, 233 U. S. 389, 418, 34 Sup. Ct. 612,
621, 58 L. ed. 1011, 1024 (1914), where the court states that there are differences
between a mutual and a private insurance company and that "a recognition of
the differences we cannot say is outside of the constitutional power of the legis-
lature." Also cf. Lexington Mill & Elevator Co. v. Browne, 116 Neb. 753, 219
N. W. 12 (1928), where it was held that the requirements of a general ware-
ihousing act did not apply to a co-operative which -was formed under an act
authorizing co-operatives to engage in warehousing The question of unfair dis-
crimination was not raised in this case, however. Also note that in a case decided
after the Frost case the Supreme Court stated that a classification for purposes
of taxation could undoubtedly be based on the non-profit character of an organ-
ization engaged in a business affected with a public interest. Puget Sound Power
& Light Co. v. Seattle, 291 U. S. 619, 625, 54 Sup. Ct. 542, 545, 78 L. ed. 1025,
1030 (1934).
1 Some interesting facts in this connection were brought out at the hearing
before the North Carolina Utilities Commission, Oct. 7, 1936, Docket No. 839,
in re the application of the Caldwell County Electric Membership Corporation for
a certificate of convenience and necessity. Here it was shown that all the inves-
tigation as to the feasibility of the project was done by the federal Rural Electri-
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system is strikingly illustrated in the principal case. According to the
complaint, there are at present thirty-five miles of power lines in
Johnston County belonging to plaintiff which run parallel to lines de-
fendant proposed to construct. That this would cause a great waste,
for which the public ultimately would have to pay, is obvious.
The muddled situation has been somewhat remedied in North Car-
olina by a resolution of the state Authority (passed after the Johnston
County project had been approved) requiring co-operatives to obtain
certificates from the utilities commissioner before the Authority will
approve as feasible the proposed projects. However, in view of the
possibility that the federal Rural Electrification Administration might
exert its influence to persuade the state Authority to repeal this reso-
lution, it would be wise for our legislature to strike out the "complete
in itself" clause and add a provision requiring the co-operatives to ob-
tain certificates of convenience and necessity from the utilities com-
missioner. A state's electrical policy can be administered more effi-
ciently if control is centered in one 'body. There is no good reason
why the co-operatives should protest against such regulation. If there
is a real need for the proposed power line, the utilities commissioner
will grant the certificate. Nor should the privately owned utilities fear
regulated co-operatives, whose aim it is to construct only in rural areas
which are inadequately supplied with electricity at present and into
which the existing utilities do not wish to extend.2 0
CHAS. AYCOCK POE.
Torts-Last Clear Chance Doctrine.
The plaintiff's intestate, while sitting on a cross tie in a stooped posi-
tion with his elbows on his knees and his head between his hands, was
killed by the defendant's train. Deceased was shown to have been in
full possession of his faculties a short time 'before the accident. The vic-
tim made no attempt to get off the track, and the engineer, who was
violating a city speed ordinance, made no effort to stop until it was too
fication Administration, none by the state Authority. The -personal opinion of the
chairman of the state Authority was that only 100 miles of the proposed 390 mile
project were feasible; nevertheless the whole project was approved by the fed-
eral body. Impartial testimony tended to show that estimates, on which federal
approval was based, of the number of farmers -who would wire their homes and
of the number of ranges, refrigerators, etc., they would purchase, were consider-
ably exaggerated.
One of the important achievements of the Rural Electrification Authority has
been the spurring on of private utilities. E.g., the Carolina Power & Light Co.,
since the 1935 statutes were adopted, has constructed or has under construction
or has approved for immediate construction, 1,190 miles of rural lines. As a re-
sult of the co-operation of municipalities and private companies with the Authority,
there have been projected more miles of rural lines in North Carolina than in
any other statd. See affidavit of Dudley Bagley, chairman of the North Carolina
Authority, appearing in the record of the principal case, p. 49.
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late to avoid the accident, although the deceased was seen for a distance
of several hundred yards. In an action for wrongful death judgment
was given for the plaintiff, but the supreme court reversed the decision,
stating that the last clear chance doctrine did not apply and that the
action should have been dismissed on the defendant's motion for judg-
ment as of nonsuit. 1-
The doctrine of the last clear chance has long been recognized in
North Carolina,2 and has been applied especially to cases involving rail-
roads. The North Carolina court has uniformly held that a duty
rests on the engineer of a train to keep a vigilant lookout for persons or
animals on the track,3 and that he is presumed to have seen them at the
earliest moment they could have been discovered by a proper perform-
ance of his duty. As a result of this rule the last clear chance doctrine
may be applied not only in cases where a person in peril is in fact per-
ceived on the track, but also in cases where, though in fact not seen, he
would have been perceived had the engineer kept a proper lookout.4
The fact that the engineer sees a person upon the track does not
necessarily mean that he must stop or even slacken his speed. When the
victim is seen walking or standing upon the track, apparently in full
possession of his faculties, the cases are uniform in denying recovery
for his injury or death since the engineer, until the last moment, has a
right to rely upon his getting off the track. Such an action is usually
dismissed upon the defendant's motion for nonsuit.5
'Lemings v. Southern Ry., 211 N. C. 499, 191 S. E. 39 (1937).
'Note (1926) 5 N. C. L. REv. 58. According to this note the last clear chance
doctrine was first applied in North Carolina in the case of Gunter v. Wicker, 85
N. C. 310 (1880).
'Carter v. Southern Ry., 135 N. C. 498, 47 S. E. 614 (1904); Ray v. Aberdeen
& Rockfish R. R., 141 N. C. 84, 53 S. E. 622 (1906) ; Caudle v. Seaboard Air Line
Ry., 202 N. C. 404, 163 S. E. 122 (1932) ; Johnson v. Atlantic Coast Line R. R.,
205 N. C. 127, 170 S. E. 120 (1933).
'Deans v. Wilmington & W. R. R., 107 N. C. 686, 692, 12 S. E. 77, 79 (1890).
In -this case the court said, "If the engineer discover, or by reasonable watch-
fulness may discover, a person lying upon the track asleep or drunk, or see a
human being who is known by him to be insane or otherwise insensible to danger,
or unable to avoid it, upon the track in his front, it is his duty to resolve all
doubts in favor of the preservation of life, and immediately use every available
means, short of imperiling the liyes of passengers on his train, to stop it."; Pickett
v. Wilmington & W. R. R., 117 N. C. 616, 23 S. E. 264 (1895); Lassiter v.
Raleigh & G. R. R., 133 N. C. 244, 45 S. E. 570 (1903) ; Edge v. Atlantic Coast
Line Ry., 153 N. C. 212, 69 S. E. 74 (1910).
. High v. Carolina Cent R. R., 112 N. C. 385, 17 S. E. 79 (1892) ; Abernathy
v. Southern Ry., 164 N. C. 91, 80 S. E. 421 (1913); Davis v. Piedmont & N. Ry.,
187 N. C. 147, 120 S. E. 827 (1924); Redmond v. Norfolk-Southern R. R., 196
N. C. 768, 147 S. E. 287 (1929); Thompson v. Atlantic Coast Line R. R., 199
N. C. 409, 154 S. E. 630 (1930); Dix v. High Point T. & D. R. R., 199 N. C.
651, 155 S. E. 448 (1930) ; Rives v. Atlantic Coast Line R. R., 203 N. C. -227, 165
S. E. 709 (1932) ; Way v. High Point T. & D. R. R., 207 N. C. 799, 178 S. E. 571
(1935) ; Rimmer v. Southern Ry., 208 N. C. 198, 179 S. E. 753 (1935) ; Kuyken-
dali v. Southern Ry., 208 N. C. 840, 181 S. E. 625 (1935) ; Stover v. Southern Ry.,
208 N. C. 495, 181 S. E. 336 (1935).
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In the cases where a person is lying upon the track, the court says
that his prostrate appearance should suggest to the engineer that he is
helpless, and recovery is allowed by applying the last clear chance doc-
trine.6  The doctrine has also been applied where one is found dead
upon the track with no evidence other than a showing of sickness or
intoxication a short while before the injury,7 but where there is no
evidence of sickness, intoxication, or helplessness, the court has dis-
missed the action as of nonsuit.8 If one is upon the track in full pos-
session of his faculties, but with no means of escape, 9 as when one is
upon a trestle; or if he is apparently absorbed in some other activity,10
then the doctrine is applied and recovery allowed.
There have been a number of cases in which the victim was sitting
upon a cross tie in a stooped position because of sickness or intoxication,
and the court has allowed a recovery by applying the last clear chance
doctrine.1 1  In all these cases the court stated that the apparent con-
"Deans v. Wilmington & W. R. R., 107 N. C. 686, 12 S. E. 77 (1890) ; Pickett
v. Wilmington & W. R. R., 117 N. C. 616, 23 S. E. 264 (1895); Arrowood v.
South Carolina & G. Extension Ry., 126 N. C. 629, 36 S. E. 151 (1900) ; Carter
v. Southern Ry., 135 N. C. 498, 47 S. E. 614 (1904); Sawyer v. Roanoke R. R.
& Lumber Co., 145 N. C. 24, 58 S. E. 598 (1907); Holman v. Norfolk & W. R. R.,
159 N. C. 44, 74 S. E. 577 (1912); McManus v. Seaboard A. L. Ry., 174 N. C.
735, 737, 94 S. E. 455, 456 (1917). In this case the court said, "We consider it
not amiss to note that it is not always required for the application of this doctrine
that the person injured or killed should have been unconscious, but the same may
at times be presented when a claimant was in a' position of such peril that it is
evident that ordinary effort on his part will not avail to extricate him."
'Powell v. Southern Ry., 125 N. C. 370, 34 S. E. 530 (1899).
'Holder v. North Carolina R. R., 160 N. C. 3, 75 S. E. 1094 (1912) ; Henry
v. Norfolk S. R. R., 203 N. C. 277, 165 S. E. 698 (1932); Allman v. Southern
Ry., 203 N. C. 660, 166 S. E. 891 (1932); Hester v. North Carolina R. R., 209
N. C. 843, 183 S. E. 377 (1936).9 McLamb v. Wilmington & W. R. t, 122 N. C. 862, 29 S. E. 894 (1898);
McCall v. Southern Ry., 129 N. C. 298, 40 S. E. 67 (1901); Snipes v. Manufac-
turing Co., 152 N. C. 42, 46, 67 S. E. 27, 29 (1909). In this opinion the court
said, "Ordinarily, cases calling for application of the doctrine indicated arise when
the injured person was down on the track, apparently unconscious or helpless, ...
but such extreme conditions are not at all essential, and the ruling should prevail
whenever an engineer operating a railroad train does or, in proper performance
of his duty, should observe that a collision is not improbable, and that a person
is in such a position of peril that ordinary effort on his part will not likely avail
to save him from injury; and the authorities are also to the effect that an engineer
in such circumstances should resolve doubts in favor of the safer course." Hop-
kins v. Southern Ry., 170 N. C. 485, 87 S. E. 320 (1915).
"Lassiter v. Raleigh & G. R. R., 133 N. C. 244, 45 S. E. 570 (1903) ; Caudle
v. Seaboard A. L. Ry., 202 N. C. 404, 163 S. E. 122 (1932) ; Triplitt v. Southern
Ry., 205 N. C. 113, 170 S. E. 146 (1933).
" Marks v. Atlantic Coast Line t R., 133 N. C. 89, 45 S. E. 468 (1903); Guilford
v. Norfolk & S. Ry., 154 N. C. 607, 70 S. E. 393 (1911) ; Tyson v. East Carolina
R. R., 167 N. C. 215, 217, 83 S. E. 318, 319 (1914). This case quoted with
approval the following passage, "A man seated on a cross tie of a railroad track,
apparently asleep or unconscious, presents an unusual, not to say an extraordinary,
spectacle, and we think it was the province of the jury to determine whether or
not an engineer of ordinary prudence, seeing a man so situated, ought not com-
mence checking the train in time to prevent injuring him, if it should transpire
that he was unconscious or asleep." (italics ours); Jenkins v. Southern Ry., 196
N. C. 466, 146 S. E. 83 (1929).
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dition of the victim should have put the engineer upon notice that the
deceased was not sensitive of his peril.
The holding in the principal case should be contrasted with that in
Smith v. Salisbury and Spencer Railway Co. 1 2 where the deceased was
sitting upon the tracks with his elbows upon his knees and his head
between his hands when struck. There was no evidence of sickness or
intoxication. The court ruled that the case should go to the jury to
determine if the motorman could have avoided the accident by exercis-
ing due care even though the plaintiff was negligent.
In the principal case the deceased was in the same position as in the
Smith case. The victim was not sick or intoxicated in either case and
in both was perceived by the engineer; yet the principal case held that
a nonsuit should have been granted; the Smith case, that it was proper
for the case to go to the jury.
In a majority of the North Carolina cases where the victim is actually
perceived on the tracks, it seems that the court views the facts not from
the standpoint of the engineer in the cabin of his locomotive, but bases
the decision on whether or not the deceased was actually ill or intox-
icated at the time of the accident. Since these facts are not revealed until
after the accident these decisions defeat the purpose of the last clear
chance doctrine except in cases where the deceased was actually ill or
helpless. In spite of their holdings the court emphasizes the apparent
condition of the injured party. If this apparent condition of the victim
is to be the test rather than his actual condition, the court should have
affirmed an application of the list clear chance doctrine in the principal
case. CLARENcE W. GRIFFIN.
Witnesses-Privileged Communications between Physician and
Patient-Waiver Clauses in Insurance Applications.
Plaintiff, as beneficiary, sued defendant insurer on a life insurance
policy issued to her deceased husband. The application for the policy
contained a clause1 waiving the statutory privilege against disclosure
of communications between physician and patient.2 In view of the
- 162 N. C. 30, 36, 77 S. E. 966, 968 (1913). In this opinion the court said,
"If a person be seen upon the track who is apparently capable of taking care of
'himself, the motorman may assume that he will leave the track before the car
overtakes him, but he cannot act upon that presumption with respect to a person
who is apparently insensible of his danger from sleepiness, drunkenness, or any
other like cause." (italics ours).
1, . . And further waive for myself and beneficiaries the privileges and
benefits of any and all laws which are now in force or may hereafter be enacted
in regard to disqualifying any physician or nurse from testifying concerning any
information obtained by him or her in a professional capacity; and I expressly
authorize such physician or nurse to make such disclosures."2 N. C CoDE ANN. (Michie, 1935) §1798.
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fact that defendant did not rely upon the clause, the court disregarded
it in determining the admissibility of a physician's testimony.8
While the decision in the instant case is beyond criticism, it never-
theless suggests the general problem as to how, when, and by whom this
privilege may be waived, and, more particularly, the increasingly im-
portant question as to the legal effect of the waiver clauses contained
in many applications for insurance.
That this purely statutory privilege4 may be waived is undisputed.5
But, well-settled as this general principle is, the various ways in which
waiver may be accomplished deserve mention 6 in passing.
Although the privilege is plainly that of the patient during his life,
it passes to his personal representative at his death; and the latter may
waive it.7 The Wisconsin Court, however, holds that the privilege
becomes even more sacred after the death of the patient and that the
deceased's representative is incapable of waiving it. s
Unless a statute requires express waiver, 9 the privilege may be
waived by implication. The bringing of an action by the patient or
his representative, in itself, will not constitute a waiver even when an
essential issue is the existence of a physical ailment,' 0 e.g., in actions
'Creech v. Woodmen of the World, 211 N. C. 658, 191 S. E. 840 (1937).
'This privilege did not exist at common law. Sherman v. Sherman, 1 Root
486 (Conn. 1793) ; Remington v. Rhode Island Co., 37 R. I. 393, 93 Atl. 33 (1915) ;
Banigan v. Banigan, 26 R..I. 454, 59 AtI. 313 (1904) ; Crow v. State, 89 Tex. Cr.
149, 230 S. W. 148 (1921) ; Trial of Duchess of Kingston, 20 How. St. Tr. 573
(House of Lords, 1776) ; 5 WIGMOaRE, EVIDENCE (2d ed. 1923) §2380.
Twenty-seven jurisdictions in the United States have created this privilege by
statute. 5 WIGMORE, EvmEcE (2d ed. 1923) §2380, note 5.
Since this privilege is strictly statutory, the decisions are controlled by the
wording and construction of the statute of the particular jurisdiction. However,
general propositions in regard to waiver may be derived from analogy to other
privileges for confidential communications which did exist at common law, e.g.,
between attorney and client, husband and wife.
55 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE (2d ed. 1923) §2388.
'The following is not intended to be an exhaustive analysis of all the cases
dealing with the various types of waiver, but merely an illustrative foundation
for the discussion of -the particular problem of waiver clauses in applications
for insurance.
Schirmer v. Baldwin, 182 Ark. 581, 32 S. W. (2d) 162 (1930) ; Marker v.
McCue, 50 Idaho 462, 297 Pac. 401 (1931); Penna. Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Wiler,
100 Ind. 92 (1884); Miser v. Iowa State Traveling Men's Ass'n, 273 N. W. 155
(Iowa 1937); Goram v. Hickey, 145 Kan. 54, 64 P. (2d) 587 (1937) (heirs en-
titled to waive the privilege although executor of the will opposed.waiver) ; Fraser
v. Jennison, 42 Mich. 206, 3 N. W. 882 (1897); Parker v. Parker, 78 Neb. 535,
111 N. W. 119 (1907); National Life and Casualty Co. v. Heard, 148 Okla. 274,
298 Pac. 619 (1931); Indus. Comm. of Ohio v. Warnke, 131 Ohio St. 140, 2
N. E. (2d) 248 (1936).
' Borosich v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 191 Wis. 239, 210 N. W. 829 (1926);
Maine v. Maryland Casualty Co., 172 Wis. 350, 178 N. W. 749 (1920); In re
Hunt's Will, 122 Wis. 460, 100 N. W. 874 (1904).
" For an example of a statute requiring express waiver see N. Y. CIv. PRAC.
(Cahill, 1931 §§352, 354. In the absence of statute, express waiver is not neces-
sary on any principle. Cf. Blackburn v. Crawford's Lessee, 3 Wall. 175, 18 L. ed.
186 (1866).
20 But see 5 WIGmoRE, op. cit. supra note 5, §2389, in which the author severely
criticizes this rule.
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for personal injury,"1 actions to recover on insurance policies,' 2 and
testamentary contests. 13 The privilege may be waived by the patient
by referring specifically in his own testimony to communications made
to his physician.' 4 But where the patient testifies only as to his symp-
toms it is held not a waiver of the privilege, since there is given in
evidence no communication by word or act.15 Waiver may be accom-
plished by the patient or his representative in calling the physician as a
witness and examining him as to the physical condition of the patient; 16
but the offer of the testimony of one physician is not a waiver of the
privilege as to the testimony of other physicians present in consultation
with him.17 However, a waiver of the privilege as to one physician
called by the opponent (by failure to object) is a waiver of the priv-
ilege as to other physicians.' 8 A waiver of the privilege at a former
trial, however accomplished, will bar a claim of the privilege at a sub-
sequent trial.19
By far the most common form of waiver is an express stipulation to
that effect in applications for insurance. In giving legal effect to this
type of clause the courts are confronted with, the oft' presented choice
between allowing a party to contract as he pleases, so long as he acts
voluntarily, and protecting him from his own lack of vision and im-
Where so specifically provided by statute, CoDEs, LAWS, AND CONST. AMEND.
op C.Ani. (Deering, 1935) §1881, par. 4, the bringing of an action will of itself
constitute waiver. See Webb v. Francis J. Lewald Coal Co., 214 Cal. 182, 186,
4 P. (2d) 532, 533 (1931), (1932) 20 CALF. L. REv. 302.
U Federal Mining Co. v. Dalo, 252 Fed. 356 (C. C. A. 9th, 1918).
Foman v. Liberty Life Ins. Co., 227 Mo. App. 70, 51 S. W. (2d) 212 (1932).
5 WIGaMORE, op. cit. supra note 10, §2389.
SRauh v. Deutscher Verein, 51 N. Y. Supp. 985 (1898); Mutual Life Ins.
Co. v. McKim, 54 Ohio App. 66, 6 N. E. (2d) 9 (1935).
25Inspiration Consol. Copper Co. v. Mendez, 250 U. S. 400, 34 Sup. Ct. 553,
63 L. ed. 1058 (1919), aff'g 19 Ariz 151, 166 Pac, 278 (1917) ; Williams v. John-
son, 117 Ind. 273, 13 N. E. 872 (1887) ; May v. Northern Pacific Ry., 37 Mont.
522, 81 Pac. 328 (1905) ; Green v. Town of Nebagamain, 113 Wis. 508, 89 N. W.
520, 1902). Contra: Forrest v. Portland Ry. L. & P. Co., 64 .Ore. 240, 129 Pac.
1048 (1913).
"Metropolitan St. Ry. v. Jacobi, 112 Fed. 924 (C. C. A. 2d, 1901) ; Traveler's
Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Hawkins, 182 Ark. 1148, 34 S. W. (2d) 474 (1931);
Wheelock v. Godfrey, 100 Cal. 587, 35 Pac. 317 (1893) ; Pittsburg C. C. & St. L.
Ry. v. O'Connor, 171 Ind. 686, 85 N. E. 969 (1908) ; Hier v. Farmers Mut. Life
Ins Co., 67 P. (2d) 831 (Mont. 1937); McDonnell v. Monteith, 59 N. D. 750,
231 N. W. 854 (1930).
'Metropolitan St. Ry. v. Jacobi, 112 Fed. 924 (C. C. A. 2d, 1901) ; Penna.
Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Wiler, 100 Ind. 92 (1884) ; Barker v. Cunard S. S. Co.,
36 N. Y. Supp. 256 (1895). Contra: State v. Long, 257 Mo. 199, 165 S. W. 748(1914); (1914) 28 HARV. L. REv. 116; Schlard v. Henderson, 4 N. E. (2d) 205
(Ind. 1936).
' Capron v. Douglass, 193 N. Y. 11, 85 N. F. 827 (1908).
" Pittsburgh C. C. & St. L. Ry. v. O'Connor, 171 Ind. 686, 85 N. E. 969(1908); Elliot v. Kansas City, 198 Mo. 593, 96 S. W. 1023 (1906); McKinney
v. Grand St. P. P. & F. Ry., 104 N. Y. 352, 10 N. E. 544 (1887).
".. . After its publication no further injury can be inflicted upon the rights
and interests which the statute was intended to protect .... the consent having
been once given and acted upon, cannot be recalled" McKinney v. Grand St.
P. P. & F. Ry., 104 N. Y. 352, 355, 10 N. E. 544 (1887).
THE NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
providence. On the one hand we have the reasoning of Dean Wig-
more. "Since experience has shown that the testimony of physicians
who might assist in the discovery of the truth is likely to be suppressed
by the insured's claim of privilege, and since the contract of insurance
is a voluntary transaction for both parties, the insurer's insistence on
a provision of this sort in his contract is no more than a reasonable
measure of self-protection. '20 On the other hand we have the theory
of the Michigan Court. "... We remain of our opinion that . .. our
statute clearly expresses the legislative intent to prohibit, as a matter of
public policy, anticipatory waivers of this nature which are to become
operative after the mouth of the patient is closed by death.",21
The overwhelming weight of authority holds such clauses to be valid
waivers which preclude an assertion of the privilege in an action on the
policy, 22 while New York and Michigan hold these waivers invalid for
reasons to be discussed presently.'
Under the majority view such a clause is not only binding on the
insured but enforceable against beneficiaries, or any person claiming
any interest under the policy. 23 Under this line of authority the word-
ing of the particular clause is strictly construed in order to limit the
scope of the waiver. Therefore, where the stipulation is construed to
limit the waiver to communications made to physicians who examined
the insured prior to the signing of the application, the clause is not a
waiver as to future communications. 24 But evidence of communica-
' 5 WIGMO E, op. cit. .supra note 13, §2388(b).
:' Gilchrist v. Mystic Workers of the World, 196 Mich. 247, 248, 163 N. W.
10, 11 (1917).
Wirthlin v. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 56 F. (2d) 137 (C. C. A. 10th, 1932) ; Lincoln
Nat. Life Ins. Co4 of Ft. Wayne, Ind. v. Hammer, 41 F. (2d) 12 (C. C. A. 8th,1930); New York Life Ins. Co. v. Renault, 11 F. (2d) 281 (D. C. D. N. J.,
(1926) ; Andreveno v. Mutual Reserve Fund Life Ass'n, 34 Fed6 870 (E. D. Mo.,
1888) ; Trull v. Modern Woodmen of America, 12 Idaho 318, 85 Pac. 1081 (1906) ;
Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Willis, 37 Ind. App. 48, 76 N. E. 560 (1906) ; Sovereign
Camp W. 0. W. v. Farmer, 116 Miss. 626, 77 So. 655 (1918); Keller v. Home
Life Ins. Co., 95 Mo. App. 627, 69 S. W. 612 (1902); Fuller v. Knights of
Pythias, 129 N. C. 318, 40 S. E. 65 (1901); Templeton v. Mutual Life Ins. Co.
of N. Y., 177 Okla. 94, 57 P. (2d) 841 (1936).
' Trull v. Modem Woodmen of America, 12 Idaho 318, 85 Pac. 1081 (1906)
Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Willis, 37 Ind. App. 48, 76 N. E. 560 (1906) ; Keller v.
Home Life Ins. Co., 95 Mo. App. 627, 69 S. W. 612 (1902); Modern Woodmen
of America v. Angle, 127 Mo. App. 94, 104 S. W. 297 (1907); Falkinburg v.
Prudential Life Ins. Co. of America, 273 N. W. 478 (Neb. 1937); New York
Life Ins. Co. v. Snyder, 116 Ohio St. 693, 158 N. E. 176 (1927).
At least one court following the majority rule has held that such a clause
should be construed strongly against the insurer since insurer drew the contract
and since such a stipulation is provided as a means of aiding the insurer to
avoid the policy on the ground of fraudulent misrepresentations as to the health
of the insured Turner v. Redwood Mutual Life Ass'n of Fresno, 13 Cal. App.(2d) 573, 57 P. (2d) 222 (1936).
' Pride v. Interstate Business Men's Ass'n of Des Moines, 207 Iowa 167, 216
N. W. 62 (1927).
Of course, the waiver in such a case is not anticipatory, in the sense of apply-
ing to future communications; but is anticipatory in the sense of applying to a
future claim of the privilege at a later trial. Accordingly, this may or may not
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tions made subsequent to the signing of the application is admissible
where the clause provides for disclosures by any physician who
"... heretofore attended or may hereafter attend . .." the insured.25
In those applications where the clause does not by its own terms de-
fine the extent of waiver, but merely provides for waiver of the statute,
the scope will of course depend upon the construction of the statute
itself.26
The New York statute27 requires an express waiver at the time of
the trial or at the time of the examination of the physician, and there-
fore such a stipulation is held not to be a waiver.2 8 But the statute
does not affect the validity of a stipulation made prior to its enactment.2 9
The Michigan Court holds these stipulations invalid80 and attempts
to justify its position on two grounds. The first is that public policy
forbids such a waiver because it operates after death has sealed the lips
of the insured and he cannot then raise his voice in contradiction. This
argument takes no account of the possibility of a case arising in which
the patient himself sues on an accident policy, the application for which
contains such a clause. Should such a case arise8 it would be impos-
sible for the court logically to apply this argument, and if it intends to
continue its policy of holding these waivers invalid it would necessarily
have to resort to another line of reasoning. The second ground on
which the Michigan Court bases its decision is that the Michigan statute
creating the privilege3 2 provides, by amendment,8 3 only one situation
in which the privilege may be waived, %Pz., by the heirs at law of the
patient in a contest of the patient's will. It is argued by the Michigan
Court that the statute creates an "absolute privilege"8 4 and that this
fall within the ban of the Michigan Court's rule, depending upon which connota-
tion it attaches to the term "anticipatory waiver."
'Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Brubaker, 78 Kan. 146, 96 Pac. 62 (1908);
Fuller v. Knights of Pythias, 129 N. C. 318, 40 S. E. 65 (1901).
: Sovereign Camp v. Farmer, 116 Miss. 626, 77 So. 655 (1917).2
"The last three sections (creating the privileged communications) apply to
any examination of a person as a witness unless the provisions thereof are
expressly waived upon the trial or examination by the person confessing, the
patient or client!' N. Y. Civ. PRAc. (Cahill, 1931) §354.
'Meyer v. Knights of Pythias, 198 U. S. 508, 25 Sup. Ct. 754, 49 L. ed. 1146
(1905), aff'g 178 N. Y. 63, 70 N. E. 111 (1904) ; Holden v. Metropolitan Life Ins.
Co., 165 N. Y. 13, 58 N. E. 771 (1900); Davis v. Supreme Lodge, K. H., 165
N. Y. 159, 58 N. E. 891 (1900).
'Foley v. Royal Arcanum, 151 N. Y. 196, 45 N. E. 456 (1896) ; Dougherty
v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 33 N. Y. Supp. 873 (1895).
' Gilchrist v. Mystic Workers of the Wbrld, 188 Mich. 466, 154 N. W. 575(1915); Gilchrist v. Mystic Workers of the World, 196 Mich. 247, 163 N. W.
10 (1917).
'A search of the Michigan decisions reveals no case involving these facts.
I Co p. LAws MIcH. (1929) §14216.
'Ibid. (Amended 1909.)
"' It is difficult to understand what the Michigan Court means by the term
"absolute privilege." An "absolute privilege" might refer (1) to a rule of out-
right incompetency--which is no privilege at all; or it might refer (2) to a gen-
THE NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
amendment creates the sole exception to it.85 This conclusion is not
only inconsistent with the law applied to waiver of other statutory
privileges but is also inconsistent with previous Michigan decisions
which have held that the patient or those who represent him after
his death may waive the privilege expressly,6 or by failure to claim the
privilege before the physician's testimony is admitted in evidence. 87
The strictness of the Michigan rule and the weakness of its founda-
tion leave no doubt that the majority rule represents the better view.
The latter is consistent with the law pertaining to waiver of the other
privileges for confidential communications8s and is supported by the
strong argument that the enforcement of these clauses greatly dimin-
ishes the possibility of recovery on fraudulent insurance claims.
JoiaN TAYLOR SCHILLER.
uind -privilege which! must be claimed, but which is "absolute" in the sense that it
cannot be waived except by failure to claim it.
Gilchrist v. Mystic Workers of the World, 188 Mich. 466, 475, 154 N. W.
575, 578 (1915).
' Fraser v. Jennison, 42 Mich. 206, 3 N. W. 882 (1897); Grand Rapids &
Ind. R. R. v. Martin, 41 Mich. 667, 3 N. W. 173 (1897).
Breisenmeister v. Knights of Pythias, 81 Mich. 525, 45 N. W. 977 (1890).
'85 WIGMOP; EVIDENCE (2d ed. 1923) §§2327-2329, 2340.
